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FIDUCIARY LAW AND THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICE

ETHAN J. LEIB & ANDREW KENT*
ABSTRACT
A law of public office crystallized in Anglo-American law in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This body of law—defined and
enforced through a mix of oaths, statutes, criminal and civil case
law, impeachments, and legislative investigations—imposed core
duties on holders of public executive offices: officials needed to serve
the public good, not their own private interests; were barred from
acting ultra vires; could often be required to account to the public for
their conduct in office; and needed to act with impartiality, honesty,
and diligence. Officeholding came to be viewed as conditional, with
officers removable for misdeeds. These substantive duties within the
law of public office—even if not its enforcement structure—reflected
something that looks similar to modern fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care.
In this Article, we extend the historical record describing this law
of public office and make several new historical and theoretical
claims. First, there are reasons to suspect that what we identify as
the law of public office and what are now generally considered
private fiduciary duties developed together and influenced each
other. During the critical centuries we explore, the duties of officeholders such as trustees, executors, and corporate directors were
* Leib is the John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law and Kent holds the John
D. Feerick Research Chair, both at Fordham Law School. Comments and questions from
students and participants at “The Future of Fiduciary Law” symposium at William & Mary
Law School in February 2020 helped us refine our arguments. Special thanks to Evan Criddle,
our host, and William & Mary Law School colleagues Nathan Oman, Neal Devins, and Tara
Leigh Grove. Evan Criddle, Joshua Getzler, Neil Jones, Paul Miller, and David Seipp provided
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Jed Shugerman for useful conversations
and to Michael Guisinger and Jacob Fishman for research assistance.
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developing alongside the duties of public officials such as tax
collectors and government commissioners. Parliament and other
actors repeatedly used the language of trust, trusteeship, guardianship, and account to define the law of public offices. Additionally,
public law concerns about abuse of power and the need for honesty,
fidelity, and altruism in service of others may have seeped from
public law into private fiduciary law. Influential political theory
about the monarchy and lesser magistrates also used trust and
related legal language to set forth a fiduciary conception of public
officeholding; the theoretical developments in political theory not
only drew from legal concepts but also may have helped shape them.
One Article cannot decisively establish whether the similarities in
language, concepts, and timing were mere coincidence or rather
evidence of some conscious codevelopment in the law of public offices
and fiduciary law. Proving (or disproving) actual causal relationships will need to be the work of the future. We conclude with some
potential implications for our research, should further work continue
to confirm our findings here. In short, fiduciary political theorists
should be less anxious about drawing from private law models, and
private law fiduciary theorists might need to be less insistent on the
purity of the private sphere. Our research agenda invites more
mutual learning—both historically and for law and institutions
today.
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INTRODUCTION
Public law theorists who want to draw on fiduciary law to learn
more about their subjects employ a conventional narrative: fiduciary
law is private law but can be analogized or translated to illuminate
relationships in public law.1 However, the relationship between
private and public fiduciary law may be more complex—historically,
causally, and conceptually—than one of analogy or translation.2 We
aim here to begin making the case that the public-private distinction in fiduciary law is more porous than has been understood thus
far and to explore some of the potential consequences of that
finding, if it is correct.
Our contribution begins with describing a distinctive law of public
office that emerged over centuries in England—a body of rules,
oaths, practices, and norms defining what it meant to carry out the
duties of public executive office properly. This law of public office
crystallized in important ways in the seventeenth century.3 In
anachronistically modern terms, we can say that some of this law’s
prominent features look similar to the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty, as we see them today.4 The law of public office often drew
upon the language of trust, trusteeship, guardianship, and account
to describe its claims that government officials needed to serve the
public good, not their own private interests; could not act ultra
vires; could be required to account to the public for their conduct in
office; needed to act with impartiality, honesty, and diligence; and
could be removed from office for misdeeds.5 Imposing these norms
1. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to
Education, 48 GA. L. REV. 949, 986-88 (2014); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of
Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 845, 871-75 (2013); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 671, 706-13 (2013). One of us once saw things this conventional way too. See Ethan
J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
699, 705-12 (2013).
2. Our first sense that the public-private distinction in fiduciary law needed more
attention came from historical work for Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2180-82 (2019).
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. See Kent et al., supra note 2, at 2118-19.
5. See infra Part I.C.
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on officeholders was not merely ethical or rhetorical, nor was this
emergent ideology mere political theory; hard law controlled officers’
conduct and motives.6 Parliament legislated to impose oaths,
requirements to account, and rules of correct official behavior.7
Parliament used its investigatory powers to correct wrongdoing by
public officials.8 And both the Crown and, at times, private litigants
could invoke the courts when officers failed in performance, rendering the law of public office oftentimes plainly juridical.9
Seventeenth century political theory also drew upon the trust,
account, and guardianship language (while providing a framework
supporting fiduciary development of the law of public office),
especially the republican thought of John Locke, John Milton,
James Harrington, Marchamont Nedham, and the Levellers, among
others.10 Arguing against divine rights monarchists, and drawing on
Calvinist and Lutheran thinking on resistance to tyranny, these
theorists claimed that government is created through a delegation
of power with the people’s consent; power must be exercised under
the law solely for the people’s benefit; and rulers can be opposed and
deposed when the rules governing the monarch or other ruler are
violated and the people’s rights endangered.11 As we hope to show,
while these developments in political theory took inspiration from
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. See infra Parts I.A-C.
10. See infra Part I.C. Of course, some have seen important distance between the
“republicans” and the “commonwealthman.” See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION (1975). Fox-Decent has also engaged in a provocative rereading of Hobbes that
takes “trust” and “fiduciary power” to the center of Hobbes’s own conception of legal authority.
See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 1-22 (2011). We do
not address Hobbes here.
11. See infra Part I.C. Daniel Lee’s study of the French “monarchomach” writers
(particularly François Hotman (1524-1590), Philippe de Mornay (1549-1623), and Theodore
Beza (1519-1605)), who developed an early conception of popular sovereignty in opposition to
royalist absolutists while drawing on a “juridical” framework of Roman private law, suggests
that a longer version of our story should start earlier than the periods on which we focus here.
See Daniel Lee, Private Law Models for Public Law Concepts: The Roman Law Theory of
Dominium in the Monarchomach Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty, 70 REV. POL. 370, 375-76
(2008). For Lee’s account of how this Roman private law makes its way to English
constitutional thought in the Stuart period, see DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 273-315 (2016). Our research invites more work on these
connections.
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a discourse that sounded in fiduciary government, the positive law
of office similarly drew upon developing conceptions of loyalty, care,
and account.12
Although Cromwellian repression and then the restoration of the
monarchy in 1660 meant that the most radical of these ideas would
lay dormant for a time, these concepts continued to influence English thought and governance, including in the North American
colonies.13 Putting aside the violent and revolutionary implications
of some of the claims in this body of political thought, the views
advanced by those thinkers about the ultimate source of political
authority (popular sovereignty) and the proper view of public office
(created and bounded by standing laws that constrained authorizations; aimed at the public good, not private gain; and properly marked by honesty and impartial execution) are conventional wisdom
today in Anglo-American law and political culture.14
Running parallel and occasionally overlapping with important
developments in the law of public office, the private law of trusts
started taking its modern form in the period running from the late
1600s into the early 1800s.15 While the common law of account was
ancient and the figurative use of trusteeships for conceiving of
public offices can trace back to Roman law ideas,16 it is hard to
ignore a fertile period of apparent codevelopment that occurred in
this period we study. Just as public law developed parameters for
holding public officers accountable through judicial, political, and
moral frameworks, the common law and equity also concretized

12. As Pocock has shown, the legal language of “precedent, common law and ancient
custom” was used to carry on “English political argument” during the seventeenth century,
and political ideas were influenced in important ways by the legal terminology which helped
frame the debates. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A
STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY xi (rev. ed. 1987). We
suggest in what follows that the legal language of trusts was similarly generative for political
theory, but also that political theory may well have helped influence the development of both
the public law of offices and fiduciary law.
13. See infra Parts I.C, II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Parts I.B-D.
16. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. I, § 85, at 86-87 (Walter Miller trans.,
1913); see also Daniel Lee, “The State is a Minor”: Fiduciary Concepts of Government in the
Roman Law of Guardianship, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 119, 119-23 (Evan J. Criddle et al.
eds., 2018).
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their approaches to constraining private fiduciaries—doctrines and
remedies that remain with us to this day.17
During the time period we investigate, modern distinctions
between public and private office did not yet fully exist; that fact
supports our effort to problematize those distinctions.18 For instance, corporations were created by statute or royal charter, and
corporate directors were viewed in many ways as public officials.19
What are today quintessential private fiduciary offices, such as
guardian, executor, or administrator, could sometimes be created
and filled with a specific named person by statute.20
The history we relate here tells us something important about the
possibility of mutual learning between the fiduciary aspects of the
law of public offices and private fiduciary law and suggests caution
about treating these bodies of law as if they come from entirely
different sources.21 We are not the first to notice fiduciary language
and concepts in the work of some seventeenth century English
thinkers.22 Our contribution here, and suggestion for future
research, is to note the striking coincidences of timing, language,
17. See infra Part I.D.
18. See infra Parts I.B-C.
19. See DAVID KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE FIDUCIARY
LAW 290-92 (2018).
20. See, e.g., An Act to Appoint Trustees to Take Care of the Person and Property of
Joseph Ensor, an Ideot, ch. 13, 1783 Md. Laws para. 2 (appointing named people trustees and
requiring that they post a bond with security “for the faithful execution and discharge of the
trust committed to them by this act, and to comply with the directions thereof, and in all
things faithfully to perform their duty as trustees ... and to preserve his property from waste
or damage; and annually (or oftener if required by the chancellor) to render an account”).
21. Getzler, from whom we have learned so much, sometimes goes even further to argue
that “accountability is the key concept, and historically, account duties spring from English
feudal law and society where no neat split could be made between public and private.” Joshua
Getzler, “As If.” Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 973, 976 (2011)
[hereinafter Getzler, “As If.”] (emphasis omitted). The connection between private fiduciary
loyalty and its historical linkage to tax collection in manorial accounting is developed in Amir
N. Licht, Lord Eldon Redux: Information Asymmetry, Accountability and Fiduciary Loyalty,
37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 770, 773, 784-86 (2017). Even if all fiduciary obligation—private
and public—has its roots in accounting, it remains instructive to examine critical points of
contact and development in matters of trust in the time period upon which we focus here. If
anything, Getzler’s and Licht’s stories about accounting and accountability as the relevant
original category from which private and public fiduciary law sprouted only reinforce the need
to problematize the public-private distinction.
22. See, e.g., FOX-DECENT, supra note 10, at 3-4; Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A
Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993, 996-97, 996 n.16 (2017).
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and conceptual apparatus in the development of private fiduciary
duties, this body of political theory, and the law of public office—
coincidences that may suggest direct influence and borrowing.
Obviously, the historical connections between the duties that
constrain public and private offices—and their manifestations in
public and private law23—do not entail a need for full harmonization
in the respective rules that control different kinds of fiduciaries.24
Even within the private law areas that are part of modern private
fiduciary law—for instance, agency, partnership, trust law, corporate law, and the law governing lawyers—we do not see or expect
to see perfect harmonization. Different institutions, political
economies, and local design problems generate differences in
applications of the duties of loyalty and care. We do not claim that
public offices were understood to be literally the same thing as what
today we call private law fiduciary offices. For instance, a tax collector neither was nor is literally a trustee, subject to every precise
duty, legal relationship, and remedy imposed by Chancery.25 But
there were undoubtedly similarities in how the duties of the officeholders were discussed. Understanding those similarities should
not be ignored by an approach, seen in a recent article by Samuel
Bray and Paul Miller, that in effect argues that either there is
shown to be an exact identity between private fiduciary law and the
law of public office—and all their pertinent remedies—or else
scholars exploring linkages are engaged in “failings,” “misreading[s],” and “mistakes.”26

23. The idea that public fiduciary law has no “juridical” content—central to the argument
in Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism, 106 VA. L. REV.
1479 (2020)—is belied by hundreds of years of public law, which has used oaths and
institutions to reinforce the positive law of sustaining the public trust, along with remedies
of impeachments, forfeitures of office, fines, accountings, and other approaches to
enforcement. See generally Kent et al., supra note 2.
24. Some efforts might be read to go too far in collapsing the public-private law distinction
in fiduciary fields. See David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory
of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 140-41, 152, 154 (2013); Evan Fox-Decent, The
Constitution of Equity, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY 116, 129-30
(Dennis Klimchuk et al. eds., 2020).
25. See Bray & Miller, supra note 23, at 1498-99 n.84.
26. Id. at 1479; see also id. at 1526 n.181 (stating that our “attempts to tie English trust
law to public law” in a prior article were “entirely speculative”). Our hope is that what follows
vindicates our earlier speculation.
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In this Article, we can do no more than sketch support for the
suggestion that it may no longer be appropriate for public law
scholars working with fiduciary concepts to think they are misappropriating ideas wholly extrinsic to public law. We want to plant
and grow the idea that we very well might not have the fiduciary
law we know today in the private law without some cross-pollination
from the law of public office and republican political theory in the
seventeenth century and to tentatively explore some of the implications for this new perspective on the public-private distinction in
fiduciary law.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in two main parts. Part I
contains historical description and analysis, tracing the genesis and
evolution of private fiduciary law, the law of public office, and
related political theory, which rejected royal absolutism and viewed
government office, including the monarchy, as conditionally granted
for the good of the people. As noted, we argue that there may have
been not only coincidental timing but also codevelopment and
borrowing. Part II sketches some implications of viewing the public
law office and private fiduciary law as having common roots.
I. THE CO-EVOLUTION OF FIDUCIARY LAW, THE LAW OF PUBLIC
OFFICE, AND REPUBLICAN POLITICAL THEORY
In this Part, we take a first cut at setting out evidence of the
striking linguistic and conceptual similarity, as well as apparent
contemporaneity of development—mostly centered in a fertile period
of a little over a century starting in the early 1600s—of fiduciary
law, the law of public office, and seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury English political theory of the republican variety.
Let us also say a word about method before we lay out the
evidence. During the time period we examine, words such as “trust”
and “account” (and their variants) had and still have today, ordinary
meanings as well as specifically legal ones. Dating back to the
medieval period, the Oxford English Dictionary finds that the noun
“trust” meant, among other things, “[f]irm belief in the reliability,
truth, or ability of someone or something; confidence or faith in a
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person or thing.”27 For just as long, the verb “account” has had the
ordinary meaning “[t]o render a reckoning.... To present an account
or reckoning of (one’s actions, etc.); to answer for, to explain or
justify.”28 The specifically legal usages probably grew out of preexisting ordinary meaning. In reading historical documents, we
have tried to pay careful attention to the biographies of authors,
grammar, context, and other clues to ascertain whether writers used
words in a legal or ordinary sense. Sometimes it seemed pretty clear
to us which was which; other times it was more difficult to tell. Even
judicial opinions sometimes use casual language rather than technical concepts. Political tracts and treatises likewise vary in their
absorption of legal language.
We pause to note this here because additional research is needed
to determine whether the many uses of language that sound in a
fiduciary and legal register were in fact self-consciously so used, or
whether instead some kind of osmotic process was underway in
which legal meanings and ordinary meanings interacted. Our effort
to reconstruct the development of the law of public office alongside
developments in trust and fiduciary law below focuses on what we
take to be significant legal uses of relevant terms, but more work
will be necessary to differentiate more clearly ordinary usages from
more technical legal ones in our corpora of material.
Section A charts the beginnings of what ultimately gets concretized as the law of public office. In Section B, we furnish a
prehistory of what eventually becomes recognized as fiduciary law.
Section C explains a critical junction when republican political
theory intervenes to affect the history of the law of public office.
Finally, in Section D, we gesture at how these developments may
have influenced modern fiduciary law.
A. The Emergence of a Law of Public Office
This Section begins tracing the development of a law of public
office that, over time, came to have important resemblances to what
we now call private law fiduciary duties. As we will show, there are
clear linguistic and conceptual similarities between this emerging
27. Trust, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015), https://perma.cc/7G6B-BFZV.
28. Account, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015), https://perma.cc/7SYE-FQPR.
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law of public office and what became known as fiduciary duties.29 In
England, a vast number of public and quasi-public offices were
required by some combination of oath, legal command, and custom
to observe a minimum of three requirements, a tripartite framework
we have called the duty of “faithful execution” in previous work.30 As
the law developed over time, officeholders had “an affirmative duty
to act diligently, honestly, skillfully, and impartially in the best
interest of the public,” were “restrain[ed] against self-dealing and
corruption,” and were instructed to “stay within the authorization
of the law and the office.”31 Obligations to account were often
present too.
Our prior research found these requirements focused on the
middling and lower level executive offices, the whole pyramid of
officialdom except the very top, which was made up of officers who
were largely “amateur, part-time and unsalaried” in the seventeenth century.32 However, there is a sense in which all public
offices came—over a long period of time—to have similar minimum
duties of faithful execution. Impeachments of peers who served in
public roles directly under the king in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries suggest as much, as does the gradual hemming in
of the monarchy, namely the growth of Parliamentary supremacy;33
the reduction of the prerogative;34 the insistence that the ruler serve
29. See infra Part I.C.
30. See Kent et al., supra note 2, at 2141-44.
31. See id. at 2141.
32. Mark Goldie, The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England,
in THE POLITICS OF THE EXCLUDED, C. 1500-1850, at 153, 154 (Tim Harris ed., 2001). The most
senior state officers serving the king took oaths promising things like secrecy and to “well and
truly ... counsel the King.” See Form of the Oath of Those of the King’s Council, reprinted in
1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 248, 248 (London, Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1810). Justices of
royal courts were directed to “do equal Law and Execution of right to all our Subjects, rich and
poor, without having regard to any Person” and swore an oath to “take [no] Fee nor Robe of
any Man, but of Ourself [the King], and ... take no Gift nor Reward by themselves, nor by
other, privily nor apertly, of any Man that hath to do before them by any Way.” Ordinance for
the Justices 1346, 20 Edw. 3 c. 13, reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra, at 303, 30304.
33. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY 27-29 (1999); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 207-08, 222-28 (2003); Kent
et al., supra note 2, at 2157-59.
34. See JOHN BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 105-06 (5th ed. 2019);
BERMAN, supra note 33, at 207-08, 222-28; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136-37,
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the public good, not private interests;35 the imposition by Parliament of an independent judiciary;36 and the stunning implications
of two depositions of kings and one regicide in the seventeenth
century.37
The faithful execution framework can be seen in nascent form in
the thirteenth century, though its origins could be older still. Use of
government office for private gain was common at this time and for
centuries later.38 Many officials in the medieval and early modern
period “paid the Crown for their offices and then farmed out the
offices to deputies, while keeping most of the fees and emoluments
of office for themselves.”39 As Gerald Aylmer describes it, “offices
under the Crown were often treated like pieces of private property,”
held on life tenure, and “sometimes even described as ‘freeholds.’”40
Many offices could be, and were, sold or devised.41
Most famously, the English kingship was understood to be both
an “estate” and an “office,” in the words of Sir John Fortescue, Chief
Justice of King’s Bench in the fifteenth century and the most
important constitutional thinker of his time.42 The language of
private property was not accidental; Fortescue and others at the
time understood kingship to be a dominium reale.43 The Latin term
*156, *183, *257; 4 id. at *391-92; Kent et al., supra note 2, at 2159.
35. See, e.g., ACT OF SETTLEMENT 1700-01, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, reprinted in 7 STATUTES
OF THE REALM, supra note 32, at 636, 637 (“That in case the Crown and Imperiall Dignity of
this Realm shall hereafter come to any Person not being a Native of this Kingdom of England
this Nation be not obliged to ingage in any Warr for the Defence of any Dominions or
Territories which do not belong to the Crown of England without the Consent of Parliament.”).
36. Id. (requiring that judges’ commissions be made during good behavior, not during the
pleasure of the monarch); see also BERMAN, supra note 33, at 227.
37. See BERMAN, supra note 33, at 225 (stating that after the Glorious Revolution “it was
clear that Parliament ... had the right to make and unmake kings”).
38. See G.E. AYLMER, THE KING’S SERVANTS: THE CIVIL SERVICE OF CHARLES I, 1625-1642,
at 106 (1961) [hereinafter AYLMER, KING’S SERVANTS].
39. See Kent et al., supra note 2, at 2144 (citing K.W. SWART, SALE OF OFFICES IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 45-48 (1980)).
40. AYLMER, KING’S SERVANTS, supra note 38, at 106, 227; see also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 34, at *36.
41. 4 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 520 (3d ed. 1945) (discussing “the
feudal confusion of office and property”).
42. S.B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 14 (1936)
(quoting JOHN FORTESCUE, GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND viii (Oxford, C. Plummer ed., 1885)).
43. J.H. BURNS, LORDSHIP, KINGSHIP, AND EMPIRE: THE IDEA OF MONARCHY, 1400-1525,
at 60 (1992); see also CHRIMES, supra note 42, at 12 (discussing how Fortescue viewed the
English kingship as a “public office” and also “real property” owned by the king).
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dominium had several significations (including “lordship”44), but an
important meaning, from Roman property law, was “absolute and
exclusive right of ownership and control,” as distinguished from
tenures in which someone might have use, possession, or occupation.45 Thus, the kingship was understood to be literally real property owned by the king (among other things), from which it followed
that the king’s heirs could inherit it.46
Turning back again to lesser magistrates, the profit motive often
led men to seek public office. Officials were paid in a bewildering
variety of ways: salaries or stipends from the Crown, often called
fees; annuities and pensions; room and board; livery (a uniform,
more or less); perquisites in kind from the Crown; and fees for
service, gratuities, and gifts from the public, sometimes authorized
by law or immemorial custom, sometimes not.47 Under these legal
and material circumstances, it is easy to see why officeholders and
the wider public understood public offices as aimed at private
enrichment at least as much as the public good.
Part of the story of the emergence of rules of faithful execution of
public office is a slow professionalization and reform of these
practices, and the gradual transformation of office from private
property for private gain into disinterested public service. During
the reign of Edward VI (1547-1553), Parliament passed the Sale of
Offices Act—which banned the sale of any public office relating to
the administration of justice, taxation and customs, and the surveying or auditing of the King’s properties.48 Offenders against the
Act forfeited their offices and were debarred from holding them
again.49 An earlier statute barred any senior Crown officeholder
from appointing a lower officer “for any Gift or Brocage, Favour or
Affection.”50
44. BAKER, supra note 34, at 241.
45. BURNS, supra note 43, at 18.
46. Id. at 60-61; CHRIMES, supra note 42, at 12.
47. AYLMER, KING’S SERVANTS, supra note 38, at 160-61.
48. Sale of Offices Act 1551, 5 & 6 Edw. 6 c. 16, reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM,
supra note 32, at 151, 152; see also G. E. AYLMER, THE STATE’S SERVANTS: THE CIVIL SERVICE
OF THE ENGLISH REPUBLIC, 1649-1660, at 78 (1973) [hereinafter AYLMER, STATE’S SERVANTS].
49. Sale of Offices Act 1551, 5 & 6 Edw. 6 c. 16, §§ 2, 5, reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 32, at 152.
50. 1388, 12 Rich. 2 c. 2, reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 32, at 55.
Brocage meant “[t]he corrupt farming or jobbing of offices; the price or bribe paid unlawfully
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The action and practice of account was another important part of
the developing law of public offices. By the thirteenth century, royal
and manorial courts enforced the duty to account for monies spent
and received by public, quasi-public, and private feudal officials,
such as sheriffs, tax collectors, bailiffs, agents, receivers, chamberlains, and others.51 Accounting also occurred politically rather than
in court. It sometimes “played out in public as political theatre,”
occurring “by the motion of peers in great councils, backed by the
threat of impeachment or trial for treason.”52
Before continuing with this story of the advancing law of public
office, we turn to early developments in the law of uses and trusts,
which were central to the emergence in England of what is now
known as private fiduciary law.
B. The Emergence of Private Fiduciary Law in England
We start with a sketch of the prehistory of private fiduciary law
in England as it has been conventionally understood,53 beginning
with a survey or census of English landholding just before 1100.54
The famous Domesday Book noted lands that were held to the use
of someone else.55 These temporary custodial arrangements—set up
for any office or place of trust.” Brocage, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
51. See generally JOHN SABAPATHY, OFFICERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
1170-1300 (2014) (discussing the duties of public officials and their accountability); Joshua
Getzler, Fiduciary Principles in English Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 471 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter Getzler, Fiduciary Principles]
(examining accountability generally and its common law enforcement in particular).
52. Getzler, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 51, at 478.
53. We put to one side the debate about how much of this ultimately traces back to
concepts from Roman law. See generally ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND
LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1-13 (3d ed. 1955) (aiming to
establish links between Anglo-American fiduciary law and Roman law); Richard Helmholz,
Trusts in English Ecclesiastical Courts 1300-1640, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 167-71 (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
1998) (questioning whether Roman law was the source of the English trust).
54. For a summary of English feudal arrangements in the aftermath of the Norman
conquest of 1066, see BAKER, supra note 34, at 241-50. At its most basic, feudalism was a
pyramidal system of hierarchical land tenures emanating from the king on down, in which
land tenure and land transfers were associated with fealty and legal obligations to one’s lord,
including military service and financial payments of various kinds. See id.
55. David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1011, 1016 (2011). Lands were held for the use of others prior to the time of Domesday Book.
See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
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when a landowner might have been off on a religious pilgrimage or
crusade, for example—permitted protofiduciary accounting within
the common law, long before equity took up the constellation of
issues created by these “uses.”56 Moreover, these accounting systems
of intramanorial management to control the bailiffs and stewards
overseeing the land in the 1100s were also applied to “public officials, who might be granted mandates and resources by the Crown
and Parliament”; their “[i]ncompetent management and defalcations could lead to claims for an account.”57
By the 1200s, statutes created remedies against lords who abused
their guardianships, actions that did not yet focus on mandating
altruism for “fiduciaries” but did set up enforceable regimes for a
kind of abuse of office.58 The office of lord had obligations directed
to both the Crown and to the tenant for the tenant’s protection.59
The Statute of Marlborough of 1267, for example, protected the
guardianships of lords from having fiefdoms conveyed out from
under them—but it also imposed special duties upon them.60
Ecclesiastical courts, which had jurisdiction over wills and
“violation of oaths” more generally, developed rules that today we
would call fiduciary.61 The most common scenarios in which these
courts were involved were overseeing charitable bequests—
generally to the church or religious orders—and bequests to children, including the supervision of a guardian.62 For example, when
Franciscans came to England, they needed to remain in poverty but
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 238-44 (1898).
56. See Getzler, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 51, at 475-76 (exploring accounting as
a social function that arises naturally before it becomes law); Licht, supra note 21, at 786-87
(discussing common law accounting in the form of manorial lords taking action “against
bailiffs who refused to render accounts”). For more on the custodial arrangements in the
following century, see generally Joseph Biancalana, Thirteenth-Century Custodia, 22 J.LEGAL
HIST. 14 (2001).
57. Getzler, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 51, at 478.
58. See Biancalana, supra note 56, at 23; Mike MacNair, Development of Uses and Trusts:
Contract or Property, and European Influences and Images, in 66 STUDI URBINATI A - SCIENZE
GIURIDICHE, POLITICHE ED ECONOMICHE 305, 308-09 (2015).
59. See, e.g., Provisions of Westminster 1259, 43 Hen. 3, reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 32, at 8.
60. See Getzler, Fiduciary Principle, supra note 51, at 480-81.
61. See Helmholz, supra note 53, at 154.
62. See RICHARD H. HELMHOLZ, 1 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE
CANON LAW AND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION FROM 597 TO THE 1640S, at 418-20 (2004).
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also have a place to live and pray; accordingly, in the early thirteenth century, they began to have third-party trustees hold their
land for their use.63 Charitable fiduciaries needed to be approved
by the court and were subject to accountings.64 Richard Helmholz
finds that “[g]uardians were subject to continuing supervision and
control by the courts,” which could remove them from office and
impose financial penalties for misuse of funds.65
The 1300s saw the increasing development of a social practice
called “feoffment to uses,”66 used to evade various feudal obligations
and strictures, among other purposes that continue to be debated.67
Feudal taxation principally occurred upon the grant or inheritance
of an estate in land; preventing those occurrences while still
transferring property could defer or prevent taxation, withholding
revenue from the king.68 The common law did not allow a freehold
estate to be left by will, but many people wanted to devise their
property.69 The Statutes of Mortmain prevented transfer of estates
to corporations (which were often ecclesiastical bodies) without royal
consent; because incorporeal legal entities would never die, taxation
was deferred indefinitely—hence the king’s displeasure at the
prospect.70 Still, many people wished to care for their immortal souls
by giving property to religious bodies, particularly as death was
approaching, and could not secure royal permission.71 For these and

63. See Helmholz, supra note 53, at 156.
64. HELMHOLZ, supra note 62, at 418.
65. See id. at 420.
66. A “feoffment” is a form of land conveyance, namely a “grant in fee simple. It is made
by a ‘feoffor’ to a ‘feoffee.’” BAKER, supra note 34, at 268 n.5.
67. Robert Palmer rejects the explanation for “uses” that focuses on feudal incidents and
prefers an explanation that emphasized the use’s “redistribut[ion of] wealth from the magnates to the gentry” with the magnates’ cooperation because it promoted “the ethical
objectives supported by governmental policy: paying debts, giving full value to purchasers,
strengthening governance in the family, providing for one’s soul.” ROBERT C. PALMER, ENGLISH
LAW IN THE AGE OF THE BLACK DEATH, 1348-1381: A TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE AND
LAW 133 (1993).
68. BAKER, supra note 34, at 263-64; F. W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in STATE,
TRUST AND CORPORATION 75, 84-85 (David Runciman & Magnus Ryan eds., 2003); Seipp,
supra note 55, at 1015.
69. BAKER, supra note 34, at 268 n.9; Maitland, supra note 68, at 84.
70. BAKER, supra note 34, at 262-63.
71. Id. at 271-72.
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other reasons, the practice of “uses” developed and spread rapidly
and widely.72
In its most basic form, a use worked as follows. The legal owner
of an estate in land who wished to avoid one of the above prohibitions or problems would transfer bare legal title to a third party—
often more than one—on the condition that the land be held for the
beneficial enjoyment and use of others.73 The original landholder
would “enfeoff” the land to feoffees for the use of the beneficiary,
later called the cestuy que use.74
However, the beneficiary had no remedy in the common law for
feoffees who misbehaved—and the feoffees had full legal title, could
sell or grant the land, and could sue and be sued in relation to the
land.75 The realization of the grantor’s wishes depended initially on
the good faith and conscience of the feoffees. Without a remedy in
common law courts, eventually other fora such as the ecclesiastical
courts and the Chancery stepped up as courts of conscience.76
Evasion of feudal duties through uses was known to the king and
Parliament, but the practice of someone having legal title to be used
for the benefit of someone else was already well entrenched.77
The early fifteenth century saw both ecclesiastical courts and
chancellors starting to act more regularly on complaints that
feoffees to uses were violating feoffors’ instructions.78 By the mid1400s, petitions in Parliament mentioned the language of “trust”

72. Id.; Maitland, supra note 68, at 87. Palmer traces the rise of the social use to the Black
Plague and attributes the growth of the use to what he assumes must have been more
favorable attitudes in Chancery to their enforcement in 1359 or 1369. See PALMER, supra note
67, at 114, 116.
73. BAKER, supra note 34, at 267-69.
74. Id.; Seipp, supra note 55, at 1015.
75. 6 JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483-1558, at 654-55
(2003); Seipp, supra note 55, at 1016. For more on the development of uses in the fourteenth
century and beyond, see generally Joseph Biancalana, Medieval Uses, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE,
supra note 53, at 111.
76. HELMHOLZ, supra note 62, at 421-22; BAKER, supra note 34, at 270; Seipp, supra note
55, at 1016; PALMER, supra note 67, at 112, 115, 127-28.
77. Seipp, supra note 55, at 1017 (“In 1402 the House of Commons prayed for a remedy
... against ‘disloyal’ feoffees.... [But n]o statute was passed.”).
78. See R.H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1513
(1979) (discussing the increase in ecclesiastical jurisdiction); Biancalana, supra note 75, at 149
(putting the first record of a chancellor’s enforcement at 1409); BAKER, supra note 34, at 270
(finding settled Chancery jurisdiction over uses by the 1420s).
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instead of “use,” and two cases called uses “trusts” or “confidences.”79
By the middle of the fifteenth century, these cases were disappearing from the ecclesiastical docket,80 though as late as 1481,
executors needed to get “ecclesiastical court permission for any selfdealing.”81 Still, once the Chancery court mostly took over the
docket, equity trust enforcement started in earnest.82 The reported
cases starting in the fifteenth century commonly show that granting
legal title in land upon “trust and confidence” for the beneficial use
of someone else was treated by the courts as the hallmark of the
creation of a use.83 The early 1500s saw some action in the common
law courts, which treated the holding of a feoffee to a feoffor’s
instruction as enforceable and heard arguments about executors’
self-dealing as improper.84 However, the main case law development
occurred later in the Chancery courts in equity.
During the reign of Henry VIII (1509-1547), the King was tired of
the lost revenue caused by the legal fiction of uses.85 Accordingly, he
started making efforts to delegitimize feoffment to uses including by
litigating against them as frauds.86 Yet he had to contend with
centuries of widespread practice, statutes that recognized that uses
existed, and lawyers, chancellors, and judges who had been complicit in the use for so long.87 The King employed a test case in
Chancery to force judges to agree that because land could not pass
by will neither could a use of land pass by will.88 Because the decision threw so many wills and uses into a state of great instability,
79. Seipp, supra note 55, at 1024.
80. HELMHOLZ, supra note 62, at 422-23; Seipp, supra note 55, at 1017.
81. Seipp, supra note 55, at 1035 n.181.
82. Palmer tends to put equity jurisdiction’s commencement closer to the Black Plague
(say 1349-1370), see PALMER, supra note 67, at 109-10, 114, 116, 127-30, but even he does not
see “the major jurisdiction of the chancellor’s court” enforcing uses until the mid-fifteenth
century, id. at 111.
83. Seipp, supra note 55, at 1025-26.
84. See id. at 1023. In Christopher St. German’s dialogues in Doctor and Student, which
was widely read by law students and considers the divergence of the common law from
commands of conscience, “feoffment to uses” were acknowledged to be adjudicated in Chancery
court. Id. at 1020 (citing ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, at First Dialogue, prologue, fol.
1b (1528), reprinted in 91 S.S. 3 (1974)).
85. BAKER, supra note 34, at 272-73; Seipp, supra note 55, at 1028.
86. BAKER, supra note 34, at 273-74; Seipp, supra note 55, at 1030-31.
87. See Seipp, supra note 55, at 1032.
88. BAKER, supra note 34, at 274; Joshua Getzler, Duty of Care, in BREACH OF TRUST 41,
43 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., 2002) [hereinafter Getzler, Duty of Care].
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Parliament acted quickly and enacted the Statute of Uses in 1536.
Simply put, this complex statute reunited legal and beneficial
ownership in the cestuy que use, while delivering significant revenue
to the Crown.89
After this statute, though “sweepingly expressed,” the Chancery
still had room to exercise a conscience jurisdiction concerning
equitable interests in land.90 Some of the types of uses that escaped
the reach of the statute—for instance, active uses in which the
feoffee had duties to perform, such as managing an estate or providing for charitable distributions—became known as trusts as they
were nurtured over time by the Chancery court.91 Trusts became
very common and gained legal solidity over the years; by the later
seventeenth century they were recognized as real property, inheritable, and part of a deceased beneficiary’s assets for the purposes
of administering an estate.92
Early on, “[t]he personal element in trusting”—often expressed
through the formula that “trust and confidence” were placed in the
trustee—was prominent in the case law.93 As Maitland relates,
“[s]oon the Trust became very busy” and “[a]lmost every well-to-do
man was a trustee.”94 As we discuss below, the language of trusts
and trustees spread far in England, into the law of public office and
sophisticated political thought.95 According to Holdsworth, “[t]rusts
89. BAKER, supra note 34, at 275; 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *333; Seipp, supra note
55, at 1033-34. Helmholz has the ecclesiastical courts holding trustees to “faithful
accounting[s]” in the second half of the sixteenth century, with punishments of imprisonment
and excommunication for “‘unfaithful’ trustee[s].” Helmholz, supra note 53, at 166.
90. BAKER, supra note 34, at 309.
91. Id. at 309-11; THEODORE F.T. PLUNKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
598-99 (5th ed. 1956); Getzler, Duty of Care, supra note 88, at 43-44.
92. BAKER, supra note 34, at 328-29.
93. Neil Jones, Trusts Litigation in Chancery After the Statute of Uses: The First Fifty
Years, in LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 103, 105 (Matthew Dyson & David Ibbetson eds., 2013); cf. Cook v. Fountain (1676)
36 Eng. Rep. 984, 985 (noting that Lord Chief Justice North observed that “men usually trust
them most whom they love best: uses at common law were nothing else but secret
confidences”).
94. Maitland, supra note 68, at 96-97. Similarly, “an astonishingly high proportion of early
modern people held office”; one scholar estimates that around 1700, one in twenty adult males
were holding public office at any given time, which could mean about one half had done so
within a decade. Goldie, supra note 32, at 161. Thus, English legal and political elites were
experienced with the trust as well as the duties and rules of public officeholding.
95. The word “fiduciary” started being used in English, generally to refer to a trustee, by
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... from the sixteenth century onwards played” a significant role “in
the development of our public law” because of the prominence of
that legal form in “commercial, religious, political, and social life.”96
For our purposes, the most interesting feature of the development
of trust law, in addition to the wide diffusion of its linguistic and
conceptual categories into the law of public office, political theory,
and common speech, is the growth and delineation of the duties of
trustees. From early on, a core requirement of trust law was that
the trustee was bound to do whatever was mandated by the trust
instrument and to refrain from doing anything prohibited.97 What
we call today the duty of care of the trustee was shaped in the
seventeenth century in the Chancery court; Getzler suggests that “a
duty to manage with due care” developed from requirements that
trustees account for receipt of property.98
We now turn back to the developing law of public office and antiabsolutist political theory, to begin tracing in earnest the role of the
concepts of trust and account.
C. The Crucial Seventeenth Century: The Law of Public Office
and Republican Political Thought
We see the seventeenth century as a critical period, during which
conceptual and linguistic, and perhaps causal linkages of codevelopment, became manifest among the law of public office, private
fiduciary law, and English political thought, particularly republican
theory. These developments involved the monarchy, lesser public
offices, and offices today we call private fiduciary offices.
1. The Contested Idea of Monarchy
As the law of public offices and fiduciary law developed, important strands of English political theory moved from considering
public offices, especially the kingship, as the personal property of
the holder to seeing them held temporarily and conditionally, in a
the late sixteenth century. See Getzler, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 51, at 472-73.
96. 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 408.
97. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 98 (1929).
98. Getzler, Duty of Care, supra note 88, at 44.
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fiduciary fashion. The language of trust and trusteeship figured
prominently in these writings.
As discussed above, in late medieval constitutional thought in
England, the king held a dual public office and private estate or real
property dominium, which included the right to transfer by
inheritance.99 Holding the office as property did not exclude good
governance, however. The ancient idea persisted that a king must,
to avoid being a tyrant, pursue the good of his people rather than
self-interest. For instance, the medieval English legal treatise
known as Bracton taught that the king “must rule justly and ‘for the
common profit of all the realm,’” preserve the peace, defend the
Church, and enforce and abide by the laws of the land.100 Medieval
constitutional thought invoked biblical verses and the metaphor of
a shepherd to describe the duty of the king to pursue the good of the
people.101 For instance, God, through his prophet Ezekiel, said, “Woe
be to the shepherds of Israel that do feed themselves! should not the
shepherds feed the flocks?” and described King David as a shepherd
for his people.102 The idea that English kings were bound by contract
and oath—their coronation oath—to rule justly, legally, and for the
people’s benefit was old as well.103
Although older ideas persisted, newer theoretical views of the
monarchy competed in England in the seventeenth century. These
debates are significant for public officeholding, more generally
because the office of the king was the most visible and important
99. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
100. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST: FROM
THE GREEKS TO THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 194-95 (1932) (quoting Bracton). Daniel Lee has
argued that the Roman law concept of a private guardianship, “entrusted to act for the benefit
and care of their wards,” was used as an analogy for the king or ruler’s proper approach to
ruling his people in medieval political thought. Lee, supra note 16, at 123.
101. See, e.g., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP, TO THE KING OF CYPRUS 7-9 (Gerald B.
Phelan trans., 1967); see also CONAL CONDREN, ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND: THE PRESUPPOSITION OF OATHS AND OFFICES 19-20, 101 (2006) (noting that, in
medieval English thought, officeholders were said to be shepherds who needed to protect and
tend to their flocks).
102. Ezekiel 34:2, 37:24 (King James).
103. See CHRIMES, supra note 42, at 17; DAVID MARTIN JONES, CONSCIENCE AND
ALLEGIANCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND: THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF OATHS
AND ENGAGEMENTS 19 (1999); EDWARD VALLANCE, REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND AND THE NATIONAL COVENANT: STATE OATHS, PROTESTANTISM AND THE POLITICAL NATION, 1553-1682, at
19 (2005).
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public office in the realm. There were deep disagreements in the
seventeenth century about the origin or basis of the monarch’s right
to rule and the logical corollaries about the accountability of
monarchs and lesser magistrates.
James I (1603-1625) and his son Charles I (1625-1649) contended that: “[t]he monarch’s authority ... came from God, from traditional custom, and from the law of nature,” rather than from any
contractual or consensual relationship with the people;104 the monarch should follow but was not legally bound to follow the law;105
and the monarch was accountable only to God, and the people’s duty
was to obey their king.106 On a related view, the ancient constitution
of the English people, dating back before the Norman Conquest and
observed in practice since then, established a contractual relationship between the monarch and the people under which the power to
rule was to be limited by law made with consent of the people
through their representatives.107 The king was legally untouchable
and accountable only to God, but accountability was ensured
because the monarch could act only through magistrates who were
themselves bound by law and accountable at law in various ways.108
More radical views came out of Lutheran and Calvinist theology
and political theory, shaped by oppression by both the Catholic
Church and Catholic rulers, on the one hand, and conservative,
traditional Protestant rulers such as Henry VIII and Elizabeth I of
England, on the other. Although many differences existed among
104. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, TOWARD DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-RULE IN
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 96 (2016).
105. BERMAN, supra note 33, at 237.
106. Id. at 235; see also JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 5-6 (2d ed. 1922)
(summarizing the doctrine of the divine right of kings: “(1) Monarchy is a divinely ordained
institution. (2) Hereditary right is indefeasible.... (3) Kings are accountable to God alone....
(4) Non-resistance and passive obedience are enjoined by God”).
107. See BERMAN, supra note 33, at 262; KLOPPENBERG, supra note 104, at 101-02; Joyce
Lee Malcolm, Introduction to 1 THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLISH POLITICAL TRACTS xix, xxiv (Joyce Lee Malcolm ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY]; see also EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 57 (1988) (noting that the idea of divine
right of kings to rule coexisted with a notion of “[s]ome vague sort of popular consent or choice
in the distant past, renewed from time to time in the coronation ceremony”).
108. See, e.g., MATTHEW HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING 14-15 (D.E.C. Yale ed.,
1976). Hale likely wrote most of this text during the interregnum and substantially completed
it by the early 1660s. See id. at xxiv-xxvi.
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the various radical Protestant theories of politics, common themes
included: the right to rule is ordained by God,109 but men are naturally free and so government over them is the product of their
consent; Christian rulers must govern in a godly and lawful way, for
the benefit of the people, not themselves; and rulers who flagrantly
violate the conditions under which they rule might be disobeyed
and may, perhaps—this was enormously controversial—be actively resisted and removed from office.110 As we will see, the conception
of public office as fiduciary came to prevail, even while there was
persistent disagreement about whether resistance of unjust or unChristian monarchs was lawful.111
2. Seventeenth Century Battles over the Nature of Officeholding
Before the Civil Wars
Moving from high theory about the monarchy to concrete political
battles, we see that starting in the early seventeenth century Parliament and other actors attacked corruption, overreaching, and
misgovernment by Stuart kings, often with a focus on abuses related to public offices and on the Stuarts’ pretensions to exercise
absolutist rule.112 Near the end of James I’s reign, Parliament
109. See Romans 13:1 (King James) (“[T]he powers that be are ordained of God.”). For this
view expressed by Martin Luther and John Calvin, see 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE AGE OF REFORMATION 15, 193 (1978);
BERMAN, supra note 33, at 97; DAVID D. HALL, THE PURITANS: A TRANSATLANTIC HISTORY 25
(2019).
110. See SKINNER, supra note 109, at 237-38, 300-01, 347-48; JOHN WITTE, JR., THE
REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM
114-17, 119-21, 134-41, 200-03 (2007); HALL, supra note 109, at 25, 36-37, 106-07; BERMAN,
supra note 33, at 42-44, 66-67, 85-86, 90; JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY
OF SOVEREIGNTY: MIXED MONARCHY AND THE RIGHT OF RESISTANCE IN THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1-52 (1978); John Coffey, Religious Thought, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 447, 457-58 (Michael J. Braddick ed., 2015)
[hereinafter BRADDICK, HANDBOOK].
111. See infra Part I.D.
112. There were, of course, a wide array of issues that caused conflict between the Stuarts,
on the one hand, and Parliaments and other groups and interests in England and Scotland,
on the other. For instance, fear of Stuart sympathy for Roman Catholicism was an enormous
flash point, as were related disputes about governance, doctrine, ritual, and toleration of
dissent for Protestant England. See PHILIP EDWARDS, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN ENGLISH
STATE, 1460-1660, at 284-331 (2001). Also controversial were attempts by James I and Charles
I to fund their activities without calling a Parliament; the Crown’s creation of prerogative
courts, without Parliamentary consent, which did not follow common law procedures; the
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investigated and drafted bills against officers taking excessive fees
and against the Crown creating unauthorized new offices and
selling existing ones, but James I ended these attempts at increasing official accountability by proroguing the Parliament.113 James I,
and later his son Charles I, was repeatedly pressured to appoint
royal commissions to investigate financial abuses in public offices.114
Edward Coke, the preeminent jurist of James I’s time, argued that
only Parliament could create new offices and new oaths for existing
offices, that one who abuses a public office forfeits it, and that no
officer holding a public office created by Parliament could act in
excess of the lawful authority of the office.115 For centuries before
Coke, statutes and common law allowed criminal actions against
certain public officers who abused their offices.116
Parliaments in the time of James I and Charles I used their
powers to investigate, denounce, and impeach royal officials who
were excessive in their use of public office for private gain or
otherwise failed to faithfully execute their offices.117 Impeachments
of ministers and other royal officials condemned them for betrayal of “trust,”118 “unfaithfulness and carelessness,”119 acting “contrary to his oath, and the faith and trust reposed in him,”120 and
imprisonment of subjects without ordinary judicial process; and whether foreign policy should
be guided by support for Protestant coreligionists or other bases. On these disputes and how
they led to civil war, see, for example, id. For a useful, longer study, see generally MICHAEL
BRADDICK, GOD’S FURY, ENGLAND’S FIRE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS (2009)
[hereinafter BRADDICK, GOD’S FURY].
113. AYLMER, KING’S SERVANTS, supra note 38, at 188-90.
114. See id. at 189-93.
115. See, e.g., MATTHEW BACON, Offices and Officers, in 3 A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW,
(A)-(B) (Dublin, Luke White 1793); 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, Office, in A NEW AND COMPLETE LAWDICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771); GILES JACOB, Office, in A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (London, W.
Strahan & W. Woodfall, 10th ed. 1783).
116. 1346, 20 Edw. 3 c. 6; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *139-40.
117. See AYLMER, KING’S SERVANTS, supra note 38, at 188-95, 228-29.
118. See Proceedings Against Sir Edward Herbert, [Knight] the King’s Attorney General,
upon an Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors: 17 Charles I. A.D. 1642, in 4 A
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 119, 120, 123,
125 (T.B. Howell ed., London, T.C. Hansard 1816) [hereinafter STATE TRIALS AND
PROCEEDINGS].
119. Resolutions on Religion Drawn by a Sub-committee of the House of Commons, in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1625-1660, at 77, 77 (Samuel
Rawson Gardiner ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1905) [hereinafter PURITAN REVOLUTION].
120. Proceedings Against Sir Richard Gurney, [Knight and Baronet] Lord Mayor of London,
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“neglect[ing] the just performance of his said Office and Duty, and
[having] broken the said Trust therewith committed unto him.”121
3. Kingship and Officeholding During the Interregnum
During Parliamentary rule and the Commonwealth regime,122
attempts to reform abuses of public office for personal gain included
an increase in fixed salaries, attacks on fees for service and bribery,
a move from life to pleasure (at will) or good behavior tenure, a
reduction in sales of office, and a more frequent imposition of
accounting.123 Aylmer, the leading historian of seventeenth century
English administration, writes of a preoccupation by Parliament
and political writers during the Commonwealth with “the idea of
admitting only properly qualified office-holders and of ending
venality.”124 Parliament’s famous Nineteen Propositions of 1642,
part of its attempts to negotiate a settlement with Charles I that
would greatly hem in the monarchy, argued that the great offices of
state—for instance, Lord Chancellor, Lord Admiral, Secretaries of
State, and chief justices—should be chosen only with the consent

on an Impeachment of High Crimes and Misdemeanors: 18 Charles I. A.D. 1642, in STATE
TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 118, at 159, 161.
121. The Commons Declaration and Impeachment Against the Duke of Buckingham, in THE
ANNALS OF KING JAMES AND KING CHARLES THE FIRST 151, 151-56 (1681); see also E. Mabry
Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachment
for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. L.J. 1025, 1040
(1975) (documenting a “public trust theory” of the impeachments, in which “acting contrary
to oath, to the duty of the official position, to the great trust reposed in the accused by the
King, and to the laws of the Realm” were key elements).
122. Parliamentary rule over a good part of England began in 1642, as the English Civil
War started. (King Charles I had already been engaged in fighting a rebellion in Scotland
since 1639.) The First English Civil War (1642-46), BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/English-Civil-Wars/The-first-English-Civil-War-1642-46 [https://perma.cc/A728-GNGJ].
A Commonwealth was proclaimed by the Parliamentary side in 1649, after Charles I was tried
and executed by an extraordinary court of members of Parliament and Army officers.
Protectorate: English Government, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Protector
ate-English-government [https://perma.cc/97W6-8Q7N]. The Commonwealth formally lasted
until the restoration of the monarchy under Charles II in 1660. Id. But the late Commonwealth period starting in 1653, when Oliver Cromwell became Lord Protector, is often
referred to as the Protectorate. Id.
123. AYLMER, KING’S SERVANTS, supra note 38, at 433-34; AYLMER, STATE’S SERVANTS,
supra note 48, at 82-83, 107, 114-15.
124. AYLMER, STATE’S SERVANTS, supra note 48, at 291.
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of both houses of Parliament and should hold office during good
behavior, not at will at the pleasure of the king.125
In statutes, and in denunciation and impeachment by Parliament,
the language of trust crept into the public law of the faithful
execution of office. The landmark Sale of Offices Act of Edward VI’s
time had described the revenue offices that could not be treated as
personal property as services “of Truste.”126 Parliament began
occasionally using the language of “truste and confidence” to
describe its relationship to the monarch and other public officials in
statutes.127 It appears that trust talk about public office increased
significantly during the seventeenth century, especially during the
Commonwealth period. For instance, one statute from the early
seventeenth century appointed public officials to handle money for
the benefit of farmers and apprentices, and then provided that
if any of the parties appointed and trusted by this Act ... shall in
any pointe or degree breake the trust and confidence in them in
this behalf reposed, or shall comitt any other Misdeamor or
Offence in [misemploying] of the said [sums] of Money ... or in
doing any other Act or Acts contrary to their dutie and the true
intent and meaning of this Act [commissions shall issue for the
trial of the offenders].128

Parliamentary ordinances of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate described certain public offices as “trusts,” “places of [t]rust,”
“office[s] of [t]rust,” and the like.129 Also during those periods some
125. Nineteen Propositions Made by Both Houses of Parliament to the King’s Most Excellent
Majestie: With His Majesties Answer Thereunto (York, Robert Barker printer 1642), in 1 THE
STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 107, at 145, 149-52 [hereinafter Nineteen Propositions and King’s Answers]. On the Nineteen Propositions, see BRADDICK, GOD’S FURY, supra
note 112, at 192-93, 210, 297.
126. Sale of Offices Act 1551, 5 & 6 Edw. 6 c. 16 § 1, reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM,
supra note 32, at 151-52.
127. See, e.g., Treason Act 1554, 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 10, § 4, reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 32, at 255, 256; 1640, 16 Car. c. 17, § 1, reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 32, at 120 (directing commissioners to negotiate a treaty).
128. 1609-10, 7 Jac. c. 3, § 6, reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 32, at
1157, 1159.
129. See, e.g., An Ordinance to Disable Any Person Within the City of London and Liberties
Thereof, to Be of the Common-Councell, or in Any Office of Trust Within the Said City, that
Shall Not Take the Late Solemne League and Covenant 1643, reprinted in 1 ACTS AND
ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM, 1642-1660, at 359 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait eds., 1911)
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offices responsible for handling public money were called “[t]rustees” and given statutory duties to account.130 The Self-Denying
Ordinance of 1645 required members of Parliament to resign any
other civil or military offices they held and declared that officeholders “shall have no profit out of any such office, other than a
competent salary for the execution of the same, in such manner as
both Houses of Parliament shall order and ordain.”131 Many types of
offices had express faithful execution duties as well by statute. Even
in the absence of such definition from statute, it came “to be agreed,
[t]hat in the Grant of every Office whatsoever, there is this Condition implied by common Reason, that the Grantee ought to execute
it diligently and faithfully.”132 All magistrates and judges were
accountable to the people as well as the king, because they were
entrusted by the people with their offices and duties.133
During Parliament’s long struggle with Charles I, which would
ultimately end with his trial and execution in 1649,134 documents
from Parliament and other sources conceived of the king as holding
an office of trust granted by and for the benefit of the people.135 A
broadsheet published by the House of Commons in 1643, advancing
its view that Parliament should control the militia, despite a statute
(describing London government offices as “publi[c] [o]ffices and places of [t]rust”); An Act for
Subscribing the Engagement 1649-50, reprinted in 2 ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE
INTERREGNUM, supra, at 325 (imposing a loyalty oath on “all and every person ... hold[ing] ...
any [p]lace or [o]ffice of [t]rust or [p]rofit, or any [p]lace or [e]mployment of publi[c] [t]rust
whatsoever”); An Act for Transferring the Powers of the Committee for Indem[ ]nity 1652,
reprinted in 2 ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM, supra, at 588, 590 (providing that
commissioners who would determine the indemnity due to persons who acted for Parliament
during the civil wars must take an oath: “I will, according to my best skill and knowledge,
faithfully discharge the [t]rust committed unto me”).
130. See An Act for the Further Explanation of a Former Act, Entitled “An Act for the
Selling the Fee-Farm Rents Belonging to the Commonwealth of England, Formerly Payable
to the Crown of England, Dutchy of Lancaster, and Dutchy of Cornwall” 1650, reprinted in 2
ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM, supra note 129, at 412, 418.
131. The Self-Denying Ordinance, reprinted in PURITAN REVOLUTION, supra note 119, at
287, 288. On the Self-Denying Ordinance, see BRADDICK, GOD’S FURY, supra note 112, at 35153, 370-71.
132. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 167 (E. Richardson & C.
Lintot eds., 4th ed. 1762).
133. JOHN COOK, REDINTEGRATIO AMORIS, OR A UNION OF HEARTS 12 (London, Giles Calvert
printer 1647).
134. Philip Baker, The Regicide, in BRADDICK, HANDBOOK, supra note 110, at 154.
135. See, e.g., Declaration of the Houses in Defence of the Militia Ordinance, in PURITAN
REVOLUTION, supra note 119, at 254, 256.
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vesting control in the king, described the king’s power over the
militia as one held in trust for “the good and preservation” of the
commonwealth, and argued that this followed from an “equitable”
reading of the statute, one consistent with “the public good.”136
Henry Parker, one of the most talented publicists for Parliament’s
views and the likely author of the broadsheet, noted how frequently
Charles I used the word “trust” in statements on his kingship.137
Parker leapt on this word, writing that “the King does admit that
his interest in the Crowne is not absolute, or by a [mere] donation
of the people, but in part conditionate and fiduciary.”138 “Power is
originally inherent in the people,” wrote Parker, and the fiduciary
nature of the grant in trust to a ruler meant that the power and the
office must be used solely for the benefit of the people.139 Among the
consequences following from the fiduciary nature of the office is that
“power [held] of trust ... is ever revocable.”140
Parker was right: Charles I did admit that he held a trust, but he
argued that it was both “God” and “the Law” that had “intrusted”
him with power, not the people.141 Charles I conceded that power
was to him “intrusted ... for the good of [the] people.”142 “The end” or
purpose of his “Monarchie” was this “Trust” that he must “discharge,” accountable to God and the law but not to the people.143
Charles I rejected Parliament’s demands for consent to appointments and high officers serving during pleasure, but in doing so he
adopted Parliament’s locution of speaking of those offices as “places
of Trust.”144

136. John Lilburne, ‘On the 150th Page’: An Untitled Broadsheet of August 1645, in THE
ENGLISH LEVELLERS 3, 3 (Andrew Sharp ed., 1998) (quoting AN EXACT COLLECTION OF THE
PARLIAMENT’S REMONSTRANCES, DECLARATIONS, ETC. 150 (1642)).
137. HENRY PARKER, OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS MAJESTIES LATE ANSWERS AND
EXPRESSES 4 (London 1642). For a brief discussion of Parker’s work, see Ted Vallance,
Political Thought, in BRADDICK, HANDBOOK, supra note 110, at 430, 437-38.
138. PARKER, supra note 137, at 4.
139. Id. at 1, 3, 20, 25.
140. Richard Overton with William Walwyn, A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens,
in THE ENGLISH LEVELLERS, supra note 136, at 33, 33. On Parker and others making this
point about the revocability of the King’s trust by the people, see MORGAN, supra note 107, at
58, 62-63.
141. Nineteen Propositions and King’s Answers, supra note 125, at 154, 158, 164, 168.
142. Id. at 154.
143. Id. at 169.
144. Id. at 159.
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Some writers besides Parker used the term fiduciary to describe
the office of the monarch. Samuel Rutherford, an influential Scottish Presbyterian pastor and theologian who preached several times
to the English Parliament during the civil war period, wrote that
the king’s power to rule “is a fiducarie power, or a power of trust,”
with the trust imposed on the king “by God” and “by the people.”145
Rutherford also called the king “a Tutor,” a “Patron,” and someone
safeguarding the people’s “inheritance,” from which it follows that
the king must act lawfully and in accordance with God’s laws for the
best interests of the people.146 The grant in trust of the office and the
right to rule was “conditionall,” and the people through their
representatives had a right to resist if the king abused his office or
undermined the safety and security of the laws or the true
religion.147
When Parliament abolished the monarchy and peerage and
adopted the Commonwealth government in 1648, its published
justification stated at the outset that the monarchy was an “office,”
one instituted by “the People” for “the protection and good of them
who chose him, and for their better government, according to such
laws as they did consent unto,” and that “very few [monarchs] have
performed the trust of that office with righteousness, and due care
of their subjects good.”148 The documents from 1649 charging and
convicting Charles I described him as “trusted with a limited power
to govern by and according to the laws of the land, and not otherwise; and by his trust, oath and office, being obliged to use the
power committed to him, for the good and benefit of the people.”149
Charles I instead acted tyrannically, violated his oath, failed to

145. SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEX, REX: THE LAW AND THE PRINCE 124, 129 (London 1644).
On Rutherford’s authorship of Lex, Rex and his acts and views, see WITTE, supra note 110, at
137, 220, 224; HALL, supra note 109, at 119, 243, 246, 268, 298, 307-08. For a book length
treatment, see generally JOHN COFFEY, POLITICS, RELIGION AND THE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS:
THE MIND OF SAMUEL RUTHERFORD (1997).
146. RUTHERFORD, supra note 145, at 124, 126.
147. Id. at 103, 124-26.
148. Declaration of the Commons, Stating Their Reasons for Establishing a CommonWealth, in 3 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1292, 1293 (London, T. Curson
Hansard printer 1808).
149. The Trial of Charles Stuart, King of England; Before the High Court of Justice, for
High Treason: 24 Charles I. A.D. 1649, in STATE TRIAL AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 118, at
990, 1070-72.
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follow the law, made war on his people, and violated their rights and
liberties.150
A few weeks after Charles I’s execution, the poet and republican
theorist John Milton published The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, which used arguments sounding in trust, contract, and oath
to justify the regicide. According to Milton, “the power of Kings and
Magistrates is nothing else, but what is onely derivative, transferrd,
and committed to them in trust from the people, to the Common
good of them all, in whom the power yet remaines fundamentally.”151 The king’s coronation oath bound the king to act for the
people’s interest and within the bounds of law; “if the King ... prov’d
unfaithfull to his trust,” the people were released from their
allegiance and might “depose and put to death th[e]ir tyrannous
King[].”152
Journalist and propagandist Marchamont Nedham published an
important work of republican political theory the next year, which
also figured officeholders, including the monarch, as trustees: “if any
Kingly Form be tolerable, it must be that which is by Election,
chosen by the Peoples Representatives, and made an Officer of
Trust by them, to whom they are to be accountable.”153 Nedham’s
work also explored the ideas that the people’s consent lay at the root
of any legitimate political power and that structures to provide
accountability of rulers are necessary.154 James Harrington’s
influential 1656 work, The Commonwealth of Oceana, used an
analogy to trusts to stress the importance of official accountability:
“As an estate in trust becomes a man’s own if he be not answerable
for it, so, the power of a magistracy not accountable unto the people
from whom it was received becoming of private use, the commonwealth loses her liberty.”155
150. For more on the charges and theories used to support the regicide, see generally
SARAH BARBER, REGICIDE AND REPUBLICANISM: POLITICS AND ETHICS IN THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION, 1646-1659 (1998); Baker, supra note 134, at 154-65.
151. JOHN MILTON, THE TENURE OF KINGS AND MAGISTRATES 12 (William Talbot Allison
ed., Henry Holt & Co. 1911) (1649).
152. Id. at 11, 26.
153. MARCHAMONT NEDHAM, THE EXCELLENCIE OF A FREE-STATE; OR, THE RIGHT
CONSTITUTION OF A COMMONWEALTH 41 (Blair Worden ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2011) (1656).
154. See Blair Worden, Marchamont Nedham and the Beginnings of English Republicanism, 1649-1656, in REPUBLICANISM, LIBERTY, AND COMMERCIAL SOCIETY, 1649-1776, at 45,
69-70 (David Wootton ed., 1994).
155. JAMES HARRINGTON, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE COMMONWEALTH OF
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4. Restoration of the Monarchy and the Continuation of
Fiduciary Theories of Kingship and Officeholding
As the Commonwealth gave way to the Protectorate under Oliver
Cromwell, the most radical—and violent—extensions of the ideas of
fiduciary government were no longer welcome. Reform of public
officeholding slowed or reversed somewhat, for instance concerning
life versus pleasure tenure.156 After Cromwell died and his weak son
attempted to rule, restoration of the Stuart monarchy soon followed
in 1660 under Charles II, the son of Charles I.157 One might have
guessed that the Restoration would have resulted in a rejection of
the ideals, practices, and reforms of the previous decades. But the
law and practice of faithful execution and the theory of fiduciary
government survived and even prospered, albeit in a safer form that
accepted a balanced system of monarchy and Parliament and viewed
the execution of Charles I as murder rather than the people’s lawful
right to accountable government.158
Looking first at civil administration, Aylmer documents that after
the Restoration, the government converted even more offices from
life tenure to tenure during pleasure in the mid- to late 1660s in
order for the government “to exercise closer control over its servants.”159 For centuries, “[r]eversionary grants of [public] offices
OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 1, 171 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992)
(1656). Harrington here was using the literary device of speaking his thoughts through a
character’s voice, in this instance, “the Archon,” from the Greek word meaning lawgiver. See
BENJAMIN WOODFORD, PERCEPTIONS OF A MONARCHY WITHOUT A KING: REACTIONS TO OLIVER
CROMWELL’S POWER 164-65 (2013). On Harrington’s views, including those quoted in the main
text, see Blair Worden, James Harrington and The Commonwealth of Oceana, 1656, in
REPUBLICANISM, LIBERTY, AND COMMERCIAL SOCIETY, 1649-1656, supra note 154, at 82, 10809.
156. See G.E. AYLMER, THE CROWN’S SERVANTS: GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SERVICE UNDER
CHARLES II, 1660-1685, at 93 (2002) [hereinafter AYLMER, CROWN’S SERVANTS].
157. See id. at 244-45.
158. The trial and execution of Charles I had not been widely popular on the
Parliamentary-Army side of the conflict even at the time it occurred. As part of the Restoration settlement, Parliament in 1660 had living “regicides”—those men intimately involved in
passing judgment of execution on Charles I—put to death. See Lorna Clymer, Cromwell's
Head and Milton's Hair: Corpse Theory in Spectacular Bodies of the Interregnum, in 40
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 91, 97, 99 (1999). The corpses of a few already deceased ones, such as
Cromwell, were exhumed, hanged, and beheaded. Id. at 91. For further discussion on the
response to the execution of Charles I, see ROBERT TOMBS, THE ENGLISH AND THEIR HISTORY
239-41, 252 (2015).
159. AYLMER, CROWN’S SERVANTS, supra note 156, at 93-94.
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were ... long-established and widespread,” but the practice almost
entirely ceased during the interregnum and did not substantially
resume after the Restoration.160 During the Commonwealth, Parliament markedly increased both the use of salaries as a form of
compensation and the amount of salaries.161 The reason had been
that both salaries themselves (instead of fees for service) and
“adequate pay help[ed] to make people less dishonest.”162 Salarization remained in place for some public offices after 1660, but the
revived Stuart system tolerated and increased the fee-for-service
model for paying public officers.163 By modern standards, public
officers likely engaged in significant self-dealing and corruption;
however, from a long-term retrospective view, we can see the
gradual but clear development of “faithful execution” norms and
laws.
In creating offices, Parliament continued this trend. As described
above, officeholders came to have “an affirmative duty to act diligently, honestly, skillfully, and impartially in the best interest of
the public”; were “restrain[ed] against self-dealing and corruption”;
and were instructed to “stay within the authorization of the law
and the office.”164 A substantial body of case law fleshed out and
gave legal bite to the faithful execution duties of public officers. At
common law, “any publick officer [was] indictable for misbehaviour in his office”165 or could be pursued by criminal information
at the suit of the Crown or a private prosecutor.166 Statutes buttressed the common law by providing for actions against specific
public officers.167 A widely used law dictionary explained that
“having the King’s commission to execute” an office makes the position “a trust, and the breach of it is punishable.”168 As a popular
160. Id. at 95.
161. See AYLMER, STATE’S SERVANTS, supra note 48, at 107.
162. Id. at 110.
163. See AYLMER, CROWN’S SERVANTS, supra note 156, at 101-02, 108.
164. See Kent et al., supra note 2, at 2141.
165. Anonymous (1704) 87 Eng. Rep. 853, 853.
166. See, e.g., Bassett v. Godschall (1770) 95 Eng. Rep. 967, 968.
167. See, e.g., 3 BACON, supra note 115, § Offices & Officers (N) (“There can be no Doubt
but that all Officers, whether such by the Common Law, or made pursuant to Statute, are
punishable for Corruption and oppressive Proceedings, according to the Nature and
Heinousness of the Offence, either by Indictment, Attachment, Action at the Suit of the Party
injured, Loss of their Offices, [etc.]”).
168. 1 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY § Action (London,
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treatise described the law, there were three types of “Offences under the Degree of capital” committed by public officers: “1. Neglect,
or Breach of Duty. 2. Bribery. 3. Extortion.”169 The kinds of neglect
and breach of duty— misdemeanors, failures to demean oneself
appropriately in public office—that were actionable included knowing neglect of duty,170 peculation,171 exercising official discretion with
a “corrupt”172 or “partial motive”173 rather than pursuing the public
interest, and a breach of “trust,” such as taking a bribe to recommend a candidate for a Crown office.174 Extortion was also a crime,
“which consist[ed] in any officer’s unlawfully taking, by colour of his
office, from any man, any money or thing of value, that is not due to
him, or more than is due, or before it is due.”175 Punishments
included forfeiture of the office.176
The criminal law was rarely or perhaps never brought to bear for
abuses of office by the most senior officeholders in the realm.177 The
holders of these offices were typically members of the nobility, and
parliamentary impeachment was the more frequently employed tool
of enforcement in these cases.178 As discussed above, impeachments
3d ed. 1783).
169. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 167 (Cornhill, Nutt
printer 1716).
170. See, e.g., Crouther’s Case (1599) 78 Eng. Rep. 893, 893-94 (involving a constable who
refused “to make hue and cry”).
171. R v. Buck (1705) 87 Eng. Rep. 1046, 1046 (involving defendant tax assessors and
collectors who imposed an “inequality of rates for the private advantage of some” and “put the
money in their own pockets”).
172. R v. Hann (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1062, 1062.
173. R v. Justices of the Peace of the Corp. of Rye (1752) 96 Eng. Rep. 791, 791.
174. R v. Vaughan (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 308, 310. On the crime of misbehavior in public
office, see RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 62-66 (1973).
175. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *141.
176. See 2 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 168, § Office; see also 4 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 152-54 (4th ed., Dublin, White 1793).
177. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1963).
178. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *121 (“Misprisons, which are merely
positive, are generally denominated contempts or high misdemesnors; of which 1. The first
and principal is the mal-administration of such high officers, as are in public trust and
employment. This is usually punished by the method of parliamentary impeachment: wherein
such penalties, short of death, are inflicted, as to the wisdom of the house of peers shall seem
proper; consisting usually of banishment, imprisonment, fines, or perpetual disability.” (emphasis omitted)); SAMUEL HALLIFAX, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW, COMPARED
WITH THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 126 (Cambridge, J. Archdeacon printer 1774) (“The MalAdministration of High Officers in Public Trusts is usually punished, in England, by the
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of high-ranking public officers occurred, and in some of these a
“public trust” view of the duties of public office is patent.179
Parliament also continued the use of trust language in describing
offices and faithful execution duties of office, both immediately after
the Restoration180 and for the rest of the time period we consider
here.181 Some of these statutes were significant ones,182 which
method of Parliamentary Impeachment, with Fine, Banishment, and perpetual Disability.”);
see also Jaffe, supra note 177, at 13, 15-16.
179. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Corporation Act 1661, 13 Car. 2 c. 1, § 3, reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 32, at 321, 321-22 (providing, among other things, that “persons then
bearing any Office or Offices of Magistracy or Places or Trusts or other Imployment relating
to or concerning the Government of the said respective Cities Corporations and Burroughs
and Cinque Ports and theire Members and other Port Towns” had to take certain oaths); 1662,
14 Car. 2 c. 11, § 31, reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 32, at 393, 400
(providing that all officers must take oaths “for the true and faithfull execution and discharge
to the best of theire knowledge and power of theire several Trusts,” and “that no person or
persons shall hereafter be imployed or put in trust in the busines of the Customes untill he
shall first have taken his Oath”); 1663, 15 Car. 2 c. 7, § 6, reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 32, at 449, 450 (referring to colonial governors as holding a “trust or
charge” and requiring they take an oath to fully implement this Navigation Act).
181. See, e.g., 1698-99, 11 Will. 3 c. 8, § 3, reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra
note 32, at 594, 595 (requiring commissioners to take the oath “I A.B. doe sweare that I will
according to the best of my Skill and Knowledge faithfully impartially and truly demeane my
selfe in the Discharge of the Trust committed unto me by [this] Act of Parliament”); 1709, 8
Ann. c. 5, § 52, reprinted in 9 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 32, at 186, 194-95 (“[E]very
Commissioner and Officer who shall act in or about the managing or collecting the Duties
[under this Act] ... shall before he shall act in or about the same take the Oath following ....
That I will faithfully execute the Trust reposed in me pursuant to th[is] Act of Parliament ...
without Fraud or Concealment and shall from time to time true Account make of my doings
therein and deliver the same to such Person or Persons as Her Majesty.”); 1747, 20 Geo. 2 c.
41, § 5, reprinted in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE 52, 54 (London, 1764) (providing that officers
appointed by the Barons of Exchequer to execute this act shall take an oath “for his true and
faithful Demeanor in all Things relating to the Trust reposed in him by the said Barons ... and
that he will not, directly nor indirectly, receive or take any Fee or Reward, or expect or accept
the Promise of any Fee or Reward, for any Thing whatsoever to be done by him in the
Execution of the said Trust (except what shall be settled or allowed by the said Barons)”).
182. See, e.g., Test Act 1672, 25 Car. 2 c. 2, §§ 1-2, reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM,
supra note 32, at 782, 782-83 (requiring both peers and commoners who hold “any ... Offices
Civill or Military,” or receive salary from grant or patent of the king, or “shall have Command
or Place of Trust from” the king or predecessors, shall “take the several Oathes of Supremacy
and Allegiance,” shall “receive the Sacrament of the Lords Supper according to the Usage of
the Church of England,” and shall also make a declaration against the Catholic doctrine of
transubstantiation); id. § 3, at 783 (providing that failure to comply voids appointment to
office); id. § 4, at 783 (providing that any person who is convicted of entering or continuing in
office without following the statute is disabled from suing, being an executor, administrator,
or guardian, receiving any legacy or gift, or holding any office in the Realm); id. § 15, at 785
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brought the statutory language of trust in relation to public offices
into newspapers and political debate.183 Parliament sometimes used
the language of “Trust and Confidence” to describe its relationship
to the king, perhaps thereby figuring the king as a trustee in whom
trust and confidence was reposed.184
Charles II issued documents using trust language to describe
public office. For instance, his patent and charter for the colony that
became Rhode Island provided for a General Assembly to make laws
and “apoynt such formes of oaths ... as are conveniente and requisite, with respect to the due administration of justice, and due
execution and discharge of all offices and places of trust.”185 The
standard form of royal commissions issued to governors of North
American colonies by the monarchs following Charles II—James II,
William and Mary, Anne, and the Hanoverian Georges through the
early 1770s—used the language of trust. First recounting that the
monarch was “reposeing especiall Trust and Confidence in your
Prudence Courage and loyalty,” the commissions went on to direct
that the monarch “require[d] [the governor] to doe and Execute all
things in due manner that shall belong unto the Trust Wee have
reposed in you according to the severall Powers and Authorities
mentioned in” this commission and later instructions.186

(providing that the Act does not apply “to the Office of any High Constable, Petty Constable,
Tythingman, Headburrough, Overseere of the Poore, Churchwardens, Surveyour of the
Highwayes or any like inferiour Civill Office, or to any Office of Forester or Keeper of any
Parke, Chace, Warren or Game, or of Bayliffe of any Mannour or Lands, or to any like private
Offices, or to any person or persons having onely any of the before mentioned, or any the like
Offices”).
183. See, e.g., The King’s Dispensing Power Explicated & Asserted, 1687, in 2 THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 107, at 817, 829, 830, 834 (defending James II’s purported
dispensing with the Test Act’s anti-Catholic rules when he placed Catholics in public offices
covered by the statute, in other words, offices of trust or profit).
184. See, e.g., 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 4, § 1, reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note
32, at 181, 181; 1689, 2 W. & M. c. 4, § 1, reprinted in 6 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note
32, at 166, 166-67.
185. Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations—1663, reprinted in 6 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3211, 3215 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
186. Sir William Phips’s Commission as Governor of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay,
COLONIAL SOC’Y OF MASS., https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/12#rch13 [https://perma.cc/
2A5V-5EU7].
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English political thought after the Restoration continued to use
fiduciary language to describe public officeholding, including the
conservative defenders of a fairly traditional monarchy, radical
writers in the republican tradition, and moderate critics of the postRestoration status quo.
Traditional monarchists used the language of trust and trusteeship to discuss public office, though typically not in relation to the
king. For instance, Robert Filmer—probably the preeminent
defender of divine right royal absolutism in seventeenth-century
England—wrote of members of Parliament using the language of
trust and trustee.187 An anonymous pamphleteer writing in favor of
the return of monarchy in 1659 argued that a king is a better
“Trustee[ ]” than governments by Parliament or the army: because
a king knows “that the weighty business of the Common-wealth
depends only upon him, [he] will probably be more careful to
perform his trust.”188 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon—a principal
advisor to Charles I during the civil wars and then Lord Chancellor
to Charles II—used the language of trust in relation to public offices
in his history on the rebellion.189 Sir Matthew Hale, who served as
Chief Baron of the Exchequer and then Chief Justice of the Court of
King’s Bench under Charles II, described the English king as above
and untouchable by “the coercive power of the law,” but “[b]y his
office” and “[b]y his oath,” he was required under the “directive
power of the law” to govern well and lawfully, and remained

187. See ROBERT FILMER, Patriarcha: The Naturall Power of Kinges Defended Against the
Unnatural Liberty of the People, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 57 (Johann P
Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680); ROBERT FILMER, The Free-Holders
Grand Inquest Touching Our Soveraigne Lord the King and His Parliament, in PATRIARCHA
AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra, at 69, 72, 87, 90; ROBERT FILMER, Observations upon Aristotles
Politiques Touching Forms of Government, Together with Directions for Obedience to
Governours in Dangerous and Doubtfull Times, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra,
at 235, 266.
188. THREE PROPOSITIONS FROM THE CASE OF OUR THREE NATIONS 2-3 (London, 1659).
189. See, e.g., 1 EDWARD EARL OF CLARENDON, THE HISTORY OF THE REBELLION AND CIVIL
WARS IN ENGLAND 7 (Oxford, The Theater 1707) (discussing “Servants” to princes as acting
“in the Execution of their Trusts”); id. at 85-86 (discussing the King promoting Anglican
“Church-men” to “Offices of the highest Trust”); id. at 157 (quoting advisers to the King on
placing reliable people “in all Places of Trust”); id. at 188 (describing “the Office of the
Treasurer of the Navy (a [p]lace of great trust and profit)”); id. at 258 (discussing bishops
acting contrary to “their Calling or their Trust”).
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“accountable for his misgovernment and breach of that trust and
oath” to God.190
It was the republicans, however, who largely used the trust
language in the way it comes down to us today. Algernon Sidney,
one of the most important writers in this tradition, was executed in
1683 by Charles II for alleged treason, based in part on his
writings.191
According to Sidney,
[G]overnments are not set up for the advantage, profit, pleasure
or glory of one or a few men, but for the good of the society....
And we may from hence collect, that in all controversies
concerning the power of magistrates, we are not to examine
what conduces to their profit or glory, but what is good for the
publick.192

The core purpose of government is “for the defence of every private
man’s life, liberty, lands and goods.”193 The “right” of magistrates to
rule must “essentially depend upon the consent of those they
govern.”194 The king’s power to rule being not “an inherent, but a
delegated power ... whoever receives it, is accountable to those that
gave it.”195 And the people’s consent may be revoked—the people
may “if need be, correct or depose their own magistrates.”196 In
drawing out these themes, Sidney’s work frequently used trust
language.197
John Locke, whose most famous political writings in his Two
Treatises of Government were published just after the Glorious
Revolution, sounded many of the same themes as Sidney. His First
Treatise largely aimed at Filmer’s defense of the divine right of

190. HALE, supra note 108, at 14-15.
191. The Trial of Colonel Algernon Sidney, at the King’s Bench, for High Treason: 35
Charles II A.D. 1683, in 8 STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 118, at 901-02.
192. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 91 (Thomas G. West ed.,
Liberty Fund 1996) (1698); see also id. at 74 (“[P]rinces as well as other magistrates were set
up by the people for the publick good.”).
193. Id. at 444.
194. Id. at 108.
195. Id. at 529.
196. Id. at 309.
197. See, e.g., id. at 223, 287, 292-93, 399-400.
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kings (Sidney’s target also),198 and the Second Treatise promoted a
view of legitimate government that remains with us to this day: a
government that flows from the consent of the governed, which must
preserve life, liberty, and property; and holds that political rulers
must pursue the public good.199 The state must also prosecute and
punish citizens who violate others’ rights—and to do this adequately, it must establish impartial judges to mete out proportionate punishments.200
By the end of the Second Treatise, some of Locke’s most famous
and controversial propositions come to light: rebellion and regicide
can be justified when political authority fails to be legitimate
because it does not provide its subjects “freedom from Absolute,
Arbitrary Power.”201 The right of revolution seems essential to
Locke’s political philosophy and forms the core of an enforcement
mechanism that presumably keeps the state in check.202
Although it is probably the social contract account of political
legitimacy that was his most enduring legacy,203 Locke also relied on
the “aspect of a trust that the rulers were required to discharge on
behalf of the people.”204 Indeed, Locke twice in the Second Treatise
appealed to the “fiduciary power”205 and “fiduciary trust”206 a
legislature gets through authorization by the people. As John Dunn
has written,

198. See generally JOHN LOCKE, The First Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 5 (Thomas L. Cook ed., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1947) (1690).
199. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 131, 135 (Richard H. Cox ed.,
Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1690).
200. See id. § 131.
201. Id. § 23. On the right to “remove or alter” government, see id. § 149.
202. See id. §§ 223-26. Irrespective of whether the ultimate picture—requiring the consent
of the governed and permitting revolutions for when the state comes shy of legitimacy—is
really one of “philosophical anarchism,” an interpretation offered most famously by A. John
Simmons, see generally A. JOHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: LOCKE, CONSENT, AND
THE LIMITS OF SOCIETY (1993), Locke’s political philosophy has played a role in supporting
constitutional republics and democracies for hundreds of years.
203. E.g., LOCKE, supra note 199, § 122.
204. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 202 (1997).
205. LOCKE, supra note 199, § 149.
206. Id. § 156; see also id. § 111 (discussing the people’s “entrust[ing]” rulers with power
only if it is exercised “for their own good”); id. § 136 (reinforcing the vision of the legislative
power being granted as a “trust” to be governed by “declared laws” and “standing rules”); id.
§§ 221, 222, 240 (utilizing the language of “trust”).
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The legal concept of trust captures nicely three features on
which Locke is anxious to insist: the clarity of a ruler’s responsibility to serve the public good, the existence of a structure of
rights external to the practical relation of ruling on which a
sovereign’s claim to authority must depend, and the inescapable
asymmetry of power between ruler and ruled which precludes
the latter from exercising direct and continuing control over the
former.207

Notice here that Locke’s use of the idea of the public trust need
not be seen as mere metaphor: constitutional rules for a legitimate
state actually follow from seeing state authority this way.208 The
legislators who Locke imagined to be legitimate had to serve the
public good rather than their own good (or be altered or removed),
and rights needed to be in place and respected in courts that could
dole out impartial justice.209 The public trust model for Locke may
not have had enforcement mechanisms as clear as the right of
rebellion,210 but neither would it be very difficult to imagine that
eventually courts would need to provide for legal equality and
nondomination in a Lockean society; courts would find ways to hold
governors to account with mechanisms shy of revolution. This form
of “republicanism,” Philip Pettit argues, “always had a juridical cast
207. See John Dunn, The Concept of “Trust” in the Politics of John Locke, in PHILOSOPHY
HISTORY 279, 296 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1984). Dunn ultimately sees “trust” to be a
summary of Locke’s ideas rather than generative of them. See id.
208. But see Bray & Miller, supra note 23, at 1492 (arguing that Locke cannot be taken to
be invoking fiduciary power or trust in a “juridical” sense); Richard Primus, The Elephant
Problem, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 383 (2019) (arguing that “Locke was using the trust
idea as an illustrative metaphor, not as a source of transposable rules”).
209. E.g., LOCKE, supra note 199, § 142 (exploring the “bounds” of the “trust” to “govern by
promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases ... designed for no other end
ultimately but the good of the people” (emphasis omitted)). To those who are too sure that
Locke is only working in the loose language of metaphor, see, e.g., Bray & Miller, supra note
23, at 1492, we want to highlight what looks to us as the juridical cast of Locke’s conception
of fiduciary government. In the final analysis, a Lockean system promotes a system of rights
and responsibilities reduced to law in statutes and constitutions. Those rights and
responsibilities are often vindicated in courts or through impeachment, as a precondition for
legitimate state authority.
210. Evan Fox-Decent emphasizes Locke’s right of rebellion as his principal mechanism to
enforce the public trust and the limits of fiduciary power. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 10, at
17 n.23. In part for this reason, Fox-Decent gravitates to Hobbes in his own work, where he
sees “determinate legal principles” in which “the constitution of legal order within a
relationship of mutual trust does the heavy lifting.” Id. at 4.
IN
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in which a central place was given to the notion of rights—
customary, legal, and constitutional rights—as bulwarks against
absolute power.”211 One could surely embrace the idea that a rather
narrow republicanism based on Locke is not legal in any workaday way and only justifies radical politics at the margins for huge
breaches of trust. Still, other more juridical models, such as the one
Pettit offers, are also surely Lockean in spirit.
Turning from more radical writers who defended a right to
revolution, trust or fiduciary language and conceptions seem also to
have been common in the political speech of moderate opposition
writers and politicians in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries. A Whig pamphlet published during the exclusion crisis
stated that by “the Oath and Office” of the king, a “great trust” is
“lodged with him for the good and benefit, not hurt and mischief of
the People.”212 In Cato’s Letters, published in the early 1720s, John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon sounded many of the themes that
we have been tracing: government is founded on consent of the
people;213 public office, including the monarchy, is a “trust”;214 rulers
and lesser magistrates must be accountable to the people;215 if
“corrupt ... Magistrates” are allowed to breach their trust with
211. PETTIT, supra note 204, at 21. Even in the inchoate form that operates at the level of
institutional design in the Second Treatise, seeing political authority as constrained by trust
principles is not merely figurative language or political morality but actually a kind of
constitutional law. Thus, although Bray and Miller are surely right that for Locke “public
office is not premised on an undertaking pursuant to a deed or settlement transferring
property to a trustee for administration on specified terms,” Bray & Miller, supra note 23, at
1492, constitutional governments of Lockean forms are routinely settled in governing
documents called constitutions where the settlors’ intent matters a fair bit—and governors
have offices of public trust with detailed authorizations and a wide body of public law
constraining the exercise of discretionary power. This is law, not mere theory or metaphor.
212. Vox Populi: Or the Peoples Claim to Their Parliaments Sitting, in 2 THE STRUGGLE
FOR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 107, at 651, 664.
213. Letter No. 60 (Jan. 6, 1721), in 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S
LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 413,
413-14 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995) [hereinafter Hamoway, CATO’S LETTERS]; Letter No. 20
(Mar. 11, 1720), in 1 Hamoway, CATO’S LETTERS, supra, at 138, 142.
214. Letter No. 75 (May 5, 1722), in 3 CATO’S LETTERS 75, 78-79 (4th ed., London, W.
Wilkins et al. 1737) [hereinafter Wilkins, CATO’S LETTERS]; Letter No. 76 (May 12, 1722), in
3 Wilkins, CATO’S LETTERS, supra, at 84, 85.
215. Letter No. 75, in 3 Wilkins, CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 214, at 78; Letter No. 115
(Feb. 9, 1722), in 4 Wilkins, CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 214, at 81, 83; see also Letter No. 76,
in 3 Wilkins, CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 214, at 84 (“Nations are then free, when their
Magistrates are their Servants; and then Slaves, when their Magistrates are their Masters.”).
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impunity, the office “in Time ... will be considered no longer as a
Trust, but an Estate”;216 and penalties for public officers’ breach of
trust should include criminal sanctions.217 Other English writers in
the liberal opposition vein viewed the public good as being the
measure of government policy and the aim of all government offices.
These authors attacked corruption and abuses of public office,
including the use of office for private profit, while stressing themes
of fidelity to the public’s trust and the need for magistrates to be
accountable.218
We now move from the law of public offices and political thought
about public officeholding to the crucial period in which modern
fiduciary duties take their shape.
D. Modern Fiduciary Law’s Awakening—and Some of Its Public
Law Roots
This brings us, finally, to a most important period of development
in what we think of today as private fiduciary law: the long eighteenth century—from the Restoration through the early 1800s219—
when punctuated changes in private fiduciary law headed into an
equilibrium that remains with us to this day.220 Not all of the inputs
into what we today would call private fiduciary law actually stem
from cases that read as private law in a contemporary typology, but
the influence of these cases in marking the history of fiduciary law
reinforces our research agenda.
Take, for example, the 1701 case of Lane v. Cotton—a case at common law rather than equity—involving an action against a postal
officer, in which the court made an effort to clarify how offices could
lead their holders to be accountable.221 The decision explored quite
directly what it meant when the common law office of post-master
216. Letter No. 75, in 3 Wilkins, CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 214, at 82-83.
217. Letter No. 20 (Mar. 1720), in 1 Hamoway, CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 213, at 138,
142.
218. See generally CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN
(1959).
219. For an example of this periodization by historians of England and Britain, see P.J.
Marshall, Introduction to 2 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 1 (P.J. Marshall ed., 2001).
220. See Helmholz, supra note 53, at 169.
221. (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1958.
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was converted from what the case called a “private” office into a
“public” office established by Parliament.222 Although channeling
this case through the common law courts hinted that public officer
accountability was likely to follow a rather different trajectory than
its private law corollaries,223 it is hard not to see the language of
“trust” and “entrustment” doing some of the work in fashioning the
metes and bounds of the law of public office in the courts. Consider
just some of the discussion: “[A] public office, intrusted ... by
Parliament, for the profit and benefit of the subject ... in its nature
requires care and diligence.”224 Moreover,
where-ever any subject takes upon himself a public trust for the
benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects, he is eo ipso bound to
serve the subject in all the things that are within the reach and
comprehension of such an office, under pain of an action against
him.225

By at least 1701, then, the language of public trust functioned to
produce law and hold officers accountable; it did not serve solely as
a rhetorical flourish or mere analogy. Nor, as we can see in this
moment of contact, were the private and public spheres developing
in wholly autonomous and mutually exclusive ways.
In 1717, fiduciary language appeared in what likely falls on the
private side of the public-private divide in an equity case, drawing
on the language of trust, which we see on the public law side as
well: “the tenant is a sort of fiduciary to the lord, and it is a breach
of the trust which the law reposes in the tenants for him to take
away the property of the lord.”226 Yet the word “fiduciary” would not
222. See id. at 1458-59.
223. Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations, in
MAPPING THE LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER BIRKS 577, 596 (Andrew Burrows & Lord
Rodger eds., 2006) [hereinafter Getzler, Rumford Market] (citing Lane v. Cotton and
explaining that “[t]he law of public office was regulated by different writs such as quo
warranto and trespassory actions until well into the mid-nineteenth century when fresh
public-law techniques of judicial review based on King’s Bench writs of prohibition, certiorari,
and mandamus were developed” (footnotes omitted)). Getzler tantalizingly suggests that “[t]he
content of the modern rules for judicial review of administrative powers were lifted from
Chancery doctrine concerning exercise of trust powers.” Id.
224. Lane, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1469.
225. Id. at 1464.
226. Bishop of Winchester v. Knight (1717) 24 Eng. Rep. 447, 448.
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be concretized into a working legal concept for some time. Indeed,
the next year in 1718, Thomas Parker, Earl of Macclesfield, the
Lord High Chancellor of England, held that trustees are permitted
to profit from their use of trust funds,227 a result radically foreign to
the modern law of fiduciaries.228
But in 1725, Macclesfield—apparently believing trustees, private
or public, are permitted to take profits in their self-interest—found
himself impeached for misappropriation of funds deposited by
litigants into the Chancery court.229 The court deemed Macclesfield
to have failed in “the faithful vigorous Discharge of the great Trust
reposed” in him, having breached his oath of “due and faithful
discharge and execution of [his] Duty.”230
Lord Chancellor Peter King, John Locke’s cousin and literary
executor, presided over the impeachment trial.231 King was a Whig
parliamentarian who served in the Court of Common Pleas,
“removed from the lax culture of the Chancery” where it had become
common to sell Chancery offices as investments.232 He generally
seemed committed to uprooting corruption and “particularly
opposed the sale and pecuniary exploitation of public offices.”233
After overseeing the conviction of his predecessor Macclesfield, King
made perhaps the sharpest statement about private trustees’
fiduciary duties of loyalty the next year in 1726 in Keech v. Sandford, a case that commenced in earnest the modern history of private fiduciary law.234 Keech established the baseline no profit and
227. See Bromfield v. Wytherley (1718) 24 Eng. Rep. 227, 227.
228. See Ratcliffe v. Graves (1683) 23 Eng. Rep. 409, 410 (ordering trustee to pay to
beneficiary the interest she received for lands held for beneficiary; trustees cannot “turn” trust
property “to their own private advantage”).
229. Macclesfield’s scheme came to light when the money could not be repaid because it
had been invested and lost in the 1720 South Sea bubble market crash. See generally JOHN
CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE (1960).
230. The Trial of Thomas, Earl of Macclesfield, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, for
High Crimes and Misdemeanors the Execution of His Office, in 6 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF
STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS UPON HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANOURS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD II TO THE END OF THE REIGN OF KING
GEORGE I, at 140, 181 (2d ed., London 1730).
231. See Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note 223, at 583-84.
232. Getzler, “As If.”, supra note 21, at 983; Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note 223, at
584-85.
233. Getzler, “As If.”, supra note 21, at 983; see also Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note
223, at 584.
234. (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223, 223-24.
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no self-interest rules that remain with us today.235 It held that
trustees cannot take profits from their offices, irrespective of
whether fraud was involved and irrespective of whether the profit
was at the actual expense of a loss to the beneficiary.236
Joshua Getzler has opined that the conception of loyalty in public
office—one that pervaded the impeachment hearing, as it was wellentrenched in the law of public office by 1725—informed Keech’s
specifications of private fiduciary obligation.237 Thus, the core of
private fiduciary law may well have emanated from a penumbra of
concerns about misappropriation of profits and self-interest already
prevalent in the law of public office and at the center of King’s
concerns in his other political positions.238 This moment of contact
between the law of public office and the private law of trusts is
suggestive of our larger theme here: that it is probably a mistake to
think private and public fiduciary law are easily severable. The
important statutes, cases, and episodes that generated legal rules
seem to feature a fair bit of mutual learning.
But we do not want to be fetishistic about 1725 and 1726, and
Peter King is no hero: King ended up taking bribes himself and engaging in nepotism for his son.239 We spotlight this case for its
propinquity of public and private law concerns. This connection
suggests that however much one wants to think that the role that
trust concepts play in political theory is merely “figurative” or decorative,240 something more constitutive may be going on. The very
nature of what a trust is in the private law was not fully sealed off
from the use of the trust conception in the law of public office. Even
cases that came after Keech later in the century that were a little
more forgiving of trustees241—allowing courts to “favour” trustees as
235. Getzler has a fascinating chapter on the development of ideas about self-interest in
this critical period in Joshua Getzler, Law, Self-Interest, and the Smithian Conscience, in LAW
IN THEORY AND HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE 250, 252 (Maksymilian Del
Mar & Michael Lobban eds., 2016) [hereinafter Getzler, Smithian Conscience].
236. See Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223-24.
237. See Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note 223, at 589-90.
238. Getzler, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 51, at 478 (“[I]mpeachment ... was one of the
streams feeding new equitable controls extended over fiduciaries in the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries.”).
239. See Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note 223, at 585.
240. See Bray & Miller, supra note 23, at 1483.
241. As Getzler writes, “Despite the ubiquity of the Keech rule today, at the time the
decision may have been regarded as marginal.” Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note 223, at

2021]

FIDUCIARY LAW AND THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICE

1341

long as there was nothing “wil[l]ful in the conduct,” “no mala
fides”—still recognized that trusteeships were “offices” and that
even when those trustees were “officer[s] of the Court,” they should
be held to the obligations and given the perquisites that were
prevalent in the private law of trusts.242 Thus, even when Keech was
not wholly embraced for its most restrictive duty of loyalty as it was
making its way into the canon, linking private and public offices to
the rules of trust survived King’s chancellorship.
The ensuing decades saw the Keech rule debated and only fitfully
applied.243 The House of Lords did not fully embrace the Keech
principle until 1795 in York Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie, emphasizing what we today recognize as a prophylactic conflict of interest
approach to fiduciary law.244 York made clear that the “danger of
temptation” was so great for people in the positon of fiduciaries that
they had to be controlled strictly.245 Ultimately, Lord Eldon reinforced this strict approach in another series of Chancery cases in
the early 1800s that remains resonant today.246 Thus, it would be
too simplistic to trace all private fiduciary law to one impeachment
in 1725.
But a seed was planted that pushed the private law of trust close
to the law of public office, just as some decades earlier the law of
public office seemingly incorporated parts of the private law of

587.
242. Knight v. Earl of Plymouth (1747) 21 Eng. Rep. 214, 216.
243. See Rakestraw v. Brewer (1728) 24 Eng. Rep. 839, 840 (extending Keech to other
fiduciary-like relationships, though not citing it); Addis v. Clement (1728) 24 Eng. Rep. 811,
813; Ayliffe v. Murray (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 433, 434 (holding that trustees-executors cannot
negotiate allowance for their work); Whelpdale v. Cookson (1747) 27 Eng. Rep. 856, 856
(holding that trustees should not personally acquire trust assets, reinforcing the rule against
self-dealing for trustee-fiduciaries); Bishop of Cloyne v. Young (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 527, 528
(eliminating any privilege of the trustee to take from the trust); Adye v. Feuilleteau (1783) 36
Eng. Rep. 784, 785 (enforcing a no profit rule with strict liability for losses); Newton v. Bennet
(1784) 28 Eng. Rep. 1177, 1179.
244. (1795) 3 Eng. Rep. 432, 446.
245. Id.
246. See generally VINTER, supra note 53, at 151 (citing Keech and an Eldon opinion, Ex
parte James (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 385, as illustrations of the strictness of the equity rule that
fiduciaries are accountable for the profits they make in their offices); id. at 48 (citing Cooke
v. Collingridge (1823) Jac. 607, 621); Crawshay v. Collins (1808) 33 Eng. Rep. 736, 741. For
a discussion of Crawshay v. Collins, see Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note 223, at 589. We
will discuss James infra Part II.
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trusts in Lane v. Cotton.247 In the middle of the eighteenth century,
another case also saw these mutually reinforcing bodies of law
playing off each other: Charitable Corp. v. Sutton.248 This was a
foundational case in the development of private fiduciary trust
law—and a central case in the development of business corporation
law, from which much private fiduciary law gets its expression
today.
In Sutton, by analyzing a strict law about breaches of trust that
was to apply against directors of corporations,249 Lord Harwicke
recognized that the relevant directors were of a “mixed nature”:
directorship “partakes of the nature of a publick office, as it arises
from the charter of the crown.”250 Even while recognizing that such
directors are not “required to qualify themselves by taking the
sacrament” commanded by Parliament for many public offices, “[b]y
accepting of a trust” the directors were “obliged to execute it with
fidelity and reasonable diligence.”251 As Getzler argues, “The office
of director was not governmental, but like the Bank of England or
the great trading companies had sufficient impact on the public to
require stern legal regulation through trust law.”252 Lord Harwicke
was also explicit that his ruling about trust law transcended the
public-private divide: “Nor will I ever,” he wrote in Sutton, “determine that a court of equity cannot lay hold of every breach of trust,
let the person be guilty of it either in a private, or public
capacity.”253 Sutton seems to foreground the enforceable nature of
legal duties from trust law against public officers. Thus, the public
and private fiduciary regimes not only came together in Keech and
Cotton but also in yet another case that sits in the jurisprudential
firmament of what we too often take to be an autonomous sphere of
private law.254
247. (1701) 8 Eng. Rep. 1458.
248. (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 644.
249. Id. at 645 (“By accepting a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to execute it with
fidelity and reasonable diligence; and it is no excuse to say that they had no benefit from it,
but that it was merely honorary; and therefore they are within the case of common trustees.”
(citation omitted)).
250. Id. at 644.
251. Id. at 644-45.
252. Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note 223, at 595.
253. 26 Eng. Rep. at 645.
254. Getzler recommends a look at R v. Windham (1776) 98 Eng. Rep. 1139, in which Lord
Mansfield studies how common law writs and fiduciary remedies might work together against
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II. IMPLICATIONS
It might seem somewhat ill-mannered to submit a work of legal
history in response to an invitation to write for a symposium about
“The Future of Fiduciary Law.” Yet the topic is appropriate, we
hope, because so much of contemporary fiduciary political theory
and private law theory presents itself as aimed at recovering and
using the past. In the case of fiduciary political theory, scholars
drawing on Cicero’s conception of office, on republicanism, on Locke,
on all the hints about fiduciary governance in the liberal political
theory canon, use history to claim some kind of authority for their
projects. Contemporary private law theory’s celebration of old
common law categories and doctrines also draws on the authority of
history—but often with the goal to protect, in some measure, the
autonomy of the private law.255 Our project here has marshalled
history to highlight just how much cross-pollination seems to have
occurred within fiduciary law itself, revealing it to be infused,
perhaps surprisingly, with both private and public concerns.
Although we have emphasized certain moments of coalescence in
the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries between the law of
public office and the law of trusts, future research could easily take
a broader swath of history and a wider lens of subject areas to explore other domains within fiduciary law that might have a history
officers of corporations with public functions. Getzler, Rumford Market, supra note 223, at 596
n.95.
255. This Article is not the place to review the extensive new literature in private law
theory, but the dynamic is evident in diverse works in the field, from the Toronto School,
which is more comfortable in legal philosophy, to the more functionalist and pragmatic New
Private Law (NPL) thinkers, whose historical authority is more likely to come from canonical
cases than canonical philosophical treatises. Compare ALAN BRUDNER & JENNIFER M. NADLER,
THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW 351-52, 357 (2d ed. 2013) (rejecting Harvard’s NPL initiative
for being too pragmatic and inclusive of public law goals, and doubling down on the autonomy
of private law by drawing on Hegelian interpretations of the concepts of freedom and dignity),
with John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640,
1663 (2012) (introducing a symposium on NPL, explaining that a new concept in the NPL is
“renewal of attention to problems and methods that for too long have been disparaged in
orthodox legal-academic thinking,” and advocating for a revival of old concepts and doctrines
distinctive to private law), and Introduction to OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW
(Andrew Gold et al. eds., 2020) (arguing that NPL generally aims to return domain-specific
legal concepts and doctrinal categories to a status where they are not reduced to epiphenomena of external perspectives on law or public law concerns).

1344

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1297

of sounding in both private and public law. Most simplistically,
taking renewed stock of eight hundred years of the role of the
lawyer—Janus-faced as a private agent of a client but also an officer
of the court bound by public oath256—could be a profitable way to see
how a hybrid fiduciary law can incorporate competing interests of
public and private law in conceptualizing role and role fidelity.257
Alternatively, consider officers and directors of corporations:
although early juristic corporations such as the Catholic Church did
not look to sovereign grace for their existence under canon law,258
English common law for hundreds of years—until the mid-nineteenth century, which saw the development of general incorporation
by statute—conceived of corporations as instrumentalities of the
state, staffed with “public official[s].”259 Corporations without authorization from the Crown or Parliament were outlawed,260 and there
was little doubt about the public status of the corporation for a long
while.261 Although it is not controversial to acknowledge that corporate law is by and large private law now,262 we should not easily
forget that manager and director fiduciary duties developed side by
256. On the centrality of the oath to the role of the lawyer in particular, see JOSIAH HENRY
BENTON, THE LAWYER’S OFFICIAL OATH AND OFFICE 4 (1909).
257. For some work exploring the mixed public-private role of lawyers, see W. Bradley
Wendel, Lawyers as Quasi-Public Actors, 45 ALBERTA L. REV. 83, 85 (2008); Evan J. Criddle
& Evan Fox-Decent, Guardians of Legal Order: The Dual Commissions of Public Fiduciaries,
in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 16, at 67. For historical work on these themes, see,
for example, Paul Brand, Stewards, Bailiffs and the Emerging Legal Profession in Later
Thirteenth-Century England, in LORDSHIP AND LEARNING 139, 139-54 (Ralph Evans ed., 2004);
Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3 (1998); Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1385 (2004).
258. See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71
MICH. L. REV. 1500, 1503-04 (1973).
259. See KERSHAW, note 19, at 290-92. Additionally, the monarch in his or her political
capacity was also considered a “Corporation.” MATTHEW HALE, THE ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 7,
29 (2d ed., London, E. Nutt printer, 1716) (describing the King, the “Supream Magistrate” in
Great Britain, as “a sole Corporation” in his “Political Capacity”).
260. See Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU
L. REV. 23, 33-36 (2002) (explaining The Bubble Act of 1720, 1719, 6 Geo., c. 18).
261. See, e.g., HALE, supra note 259, at 34, 37-38 (classifying “Mayors of Corporations” as
“Ministerial Officers,” part of the group of “Subordinate Civil Magistrates,” along with sheriffs
and constables); see also PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 3 (2011) (noting that the
English East India Company was itself “a form of government, state, and sovereign”).
262. KERSHAW, supra note 19, at 294; Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the
American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1 (1945).
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side with a conception of a trustee that had both private and public
law valences.263 Foundational trust law cases used to develop the
duties of corporate officers also reveal mixed private and public law
concerns.264 Indeed, one might argue that the very effort to divvy up
private and public law cleanly was itself a nineteenth-century
phenomenon.265
Finally, and closer in time to the period we have focused upon
here, consider a trio of equity cases decided by Lord Eldon in the
early 1800s, which are considered canonical in the reinforcement of
the strict obligations of fiduciary law against trustees: Ex parte
Lacey,266 Ex parte James,267 and Ex parte Bennett.268 Although
leading commentators discuss these cases as important in the
263. In the famous Dartmouth College case, the highest court in New Hampshire was
explicit that “[t]he office of trustee of Dartmouth College is, in fact, a public trust, as much so
as the office of governor, or of judge of this court.” Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1
N.H. 111, 119 (1817). The Supreme Court found Dartmouth had been founded by the initiative
of private parties and diminished the state’s regulatory authority over this private corporation
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). For this history,
see ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL
RIGHTS 85-87 (2018).
The colonies that eventually became the United States were themselves established by
corporations. See generally Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 1397, 1397 (2019). They often retained their self-identity as corporations too. See, e.g.,
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.); see also Dixon v.
United States, 7 F. Cas. 761, 763 (C.C.D. Va. 1811); JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the
Bank of North America (1785), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 60, 67 (Kermit L.
Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (“States are corporations ... of the most important and
dignified kind.”). Municipal corporations had obviously public functions, leading Hendrik
Hartog to remark that “the rules of municipal corporation law were formulated as ways of
regulating the conduct of entities (like New York City) that judges already knew to be public.”
HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 7 (1983).
264. See Charitable Corp. v. Sutton (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 644. In Aberdeen Railway Co.
v. Blaikie Bros. (1854) 17 Sess. Cas. 20, 21, the duty of loyalty from Keech was more generally
absorbed into the law of corporations. But “a director’s office would be vacated if he became
directly or indirectly interested” in a transaction with the corporation, akin to an automatic
impeachment, a remedy more familiar from what we today think of as public law. See
KERSHAW, supra note 19, at 316. The English law’s reliance on public trust ideas to develop
its private law of corporations also made its way to America. See id. at 341-43.
265. See Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM.
& MARY Q. 51, 55 (1993) (“Categories familiar to us—above all, those that separate public
from private corporations—are the inventions of nineteenth-century jurists.”).
266. (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1228.
267. (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 385.
268. (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 893.
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development of private fiduciary law,269 what routinely goes without
mention is that all three develop trust law in connection with
bankruptcy and insolvency law, a domain of mostly statutory and
prerogative law that was some public-private hybrid, as it remains
today.270 If still more canonical cases for what we treat as private
fiduciary law were also applied, expanded, or reinforced in hybrid
cases where the trustee’s activities implicate public law concerns, it
further suggests that core private law may be suffused with public
law considerations. At the least, this research agenda invites some
problematizing of what we thought we knew about which direction
export flows within the domains of fiduciary law.
The import of these recognitions about the instability of the
public-private distinction in fiduciary law is that many efforts in
fiduciary political theory should be less anxious about the use of
fiduciary principles in thinking through the requirements of public
office. Although many fiduciary political theorists are eager to cabin
their accounts as merely analogical or translational, there may be
justification to think of the officeholder-subject relationship as just
as quintessentially fiduciary as the trustee-beneficiary relationship.271 If further work could deepen the connections between these
bodies of law—rather than just pointing to structural and linguistic
similarities between some public law and some private law
relationships—it would go some distance to respond to criticisms of
fiduciary political theory that insist that fiduciary principles can
only be used metaphorically in thinking about public office.272
269. See Getzler, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 51, at 486-87; Licht, supra note 21, at
771-72, 794.
270. See, e.g., Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1919); Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715,
1717 (2018). Focus on the public-private hybrid that is modern bankruptcy law in the United
States has increased with renewed attention to several municipal bankruptcies, such as those
in Detroit and Puerto Rico, in which the debtor is a public entity. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger,
Towards a Jurisprudence of Public Law Bankruptcy Judging, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 39, 39 (2017). Even when the debtor is a private entity, a trustee with fiduciary duties
supervised by the courts or the U.S. Trustee often ends up with Janus-faced responsibilities
to private parties and the public.
271. Indeed, our research agenda may ultimately furnish some support for the literalists
about public fiduciary obligations. See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, The Core of
Fiduciary Political Theory, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 401, 413-17 (D.
Gordon Smith & Andrew Gold eds., 2018) (developing a typology of whether and how fiduciary
political theorists draw upon literalist, analogical, or translational approaches).
272. See generally Bray & Miller, supra note 23, at 1482.
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The benefits of understanding conceptual and historical connections between private and public fiduciary law will not only redound
to the benefit of those seeking to understand public governance with
a rich language that focuses on self-interest, corruption, and
accounting. Opportunities also exist for private law scholars to see
their subjects in new light.273 If private officeholders with fiduciary
obligations can be shown to be species of a genus that includes
public officeholders with similar core duties, it would be easier to
contemplate the use of some of the relevant norm internalization
tactics we use routinely in public law domains. To give one example,
just as we use oaths regularly to install people in public offices of
trust to ensure they understand their undertakings and duties, one
might think about whether it makes sense to require oaths for
private officeholders in positions of trust too.
Obviously, enforcement mechanisms—how we challenge and
remediate breaches of trust, and who has standing to complain
about breaches in the courts or in the courts of public opinion or in
the courts of impeachment—have developed separately in public
and private law. Private causes of action for breaches of the duty of
loyalty with a view to disgorgement look significantly different from
political impeachments. Reminding ourselves of the long history of
mutual contact between these bodies of law can provoke innovation
in how we orient institutions to motivate officers to pursue only the
interests of their beneficiaries and not to take undue profits from
their offices.
CONCLUSION
The interwoven histories we have offered here—of fiduciary law,
the law of public office, and English political history and theory—may reveal a series of grand coincidences. The law of public
trusts and the law of private trusts may both have developed their
modern shapes and legal regimes in a homegrown way, sealed off
from one another and from the political and intellectual upheavals
going on simultaneously in the world outside legislatures and
273. Some early efforts by private law theorists in this vein include Andrew Verstein,
Trustee or Delegate? Understanding Representation to Illuminate Shareholder Governance and
Regulatory Change, 9 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 74 (2012); and Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors
Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 35-36 (1966).
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courts. Indeed, it would take much more work to show that the
points of contact we have exposed here show conscious legal and
theoretical codevelopment. But it seems that the evidence we have
brought to bear at least shifts the burden upon those who insist on
“juristic amnesia”274 and leave no room for appreciating that a law
of public office—real law on the books and decided in courts—
seemed to draw from the legal concept of trust. It likewise seems
evident that what we today call the private law of trusts often drew
from a conception of office275—and sometimes public office and
notions of proper officeholding—to underwrite its strict rules. These
bodies of law look like they might be species of the same genus, and
that genus likely was influenced by significant changes in political
life in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England. We hope
we have problematized the public-private distinction in fiduciary
law and have shown the rich potential for still more historical and
normative work built on this foundation.

274. Getzler, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 51, at 490.
275. For a provocative argument that office was an organizing set of permissions and duties
in early modern England, see generally CONDREN, supra note 101. Friendship itself might
have been perceived as an office. See 1 EDWARD, EARL OF CLARENDON, Of Friendship, in
ESSAYS MORAL AND ENTERTAINING, ON THE VARIOUS FACULTIES AND PASSIONS OF THE HUMAN
MIND 111, 112-14, 116 (London, 1815).

